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Planning the Metropolis:
Regional Planning in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1945-1975

By

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THESIS

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
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The incalculable element in every scheme for urban and regional planning is not what men have and are accustomed to: but what they want, and are ready, when the want has been organized and dramatized, to reach for. Without taking advantage of the directive force of the imagination, releasing elements not given, or not dominant in a present situation, planning must remain a belated mopping up after the forces of life have spilled over: never catching up with its opportunities, committed to drifting with the current, never tacking to catch a breeze.

- Lewis Mumford

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INTRODUCTION

It is perhaps appropriate that one begins a thesis by describing what it is not. Since the time span covered by the events described in the following pages is almost seventy-five years, there are of course large gaps in the discussion.

Most significantly, I have not attempted to relate the experience of preparing the Bay Area's 1970 regional plan to the issue of regional governance. First of all, the limits of time and energy precluded such an attempt at tying planning to government. For a work that does an excellent job of covering Bay Area regional governance developments, the reader is referred to Woo, cited in the bibliography.

Secondly, in the preparation of the ABAG plan, regional government was not a direct major factor, particularly later in the program. While those in the Association were often heavily involved in the legislative battles over regional agencies, it does not seem that those involvements significantly shaped the proposals or the process of preparing the preliminary or regional plans. Of far greater importance were the dynamics of ABAG as a COG, and those are dealt with in more detail.

The issue of the relation of government to plan preparation in its more abstract form is discussed in the conclusions.

A second area this paper does not discuss at length is the analysis of the plans developed for the Bay Area. I have instead chosen to describe and elaborate on what the plans proposed rather than whether those proposals could stand up to the probing of some form of analysis. While there is certainly a need to look closely at a plan which calls for the type of proposals made in the 1970 Regional Plan, it seems that the first task is to try to understand in a thorough way what the planners who made those proposals were calling for, and the context in which those proposals

were made. Therefore, instead of critiquing methods or motivations at length, I have only attempted to piece together what was proposed, and how the process that brought about these proposals developed.

There were basically two reasons for approaching the issue in this manner. In the first place, breadth was chosen over depth so that the sweep of Bay Area metropolitan planning could be seen, however imperfectly, as a condensed whole. The value of understanding history when attempting to act in the present is to me significant, yet frequently overlooked, particularly as urban planning now grows more and more complex both as subject and profession.

In addition, I believe that the value of an historically oriented approach also lies in the opportunities it offers for distinguishing basic issues. Simplified choices are not necessarily simplistic, and it seems that much of our present city planning techniques ignore this, seemingly preferring "sophistication" before the initial conceptual choices have been made. While it is admittedly tricky business, the paper attempts to approach metropolitan regional planning on this more simplified basis and an historical view seemed most appropriate.

The second major reason for approaching Bay Area metropolitan planning from this historical point of view was simply that there has been no detailed attempt at explaining that history since Scott's 1959 effort (see bibliography).

It would therefore have been difficult to examine only the proposals of the regional plan, not knowing the context that they grew out of. While this work will probably not meet all future demands, it will certainly be a framework for those interested in probing the recent past of Bay Area metropolitan planning.

In addition to presenting metropolitan planning as an evolved activity, the thesis attempts to provide commentary on four areas of metropolitan regional planning:

- 1) The planning process: while not looking at this strictly in relation to its connection with government, the histories attempt to describe metropolitan planning as an activity of professional planners. As a result, the steps taken to prepare a plan, the pressures that those preparing institutional and especially quasi-institutional frameworks that it is prepared within are discussed.
- 2) The metropolitan physical general plan: although the words "regional plan" are used interchangeably with this term, most of the metropolitan planning done in the Bay region has been aimed at producing metropolitan, general, physical plans. What such plans deal with, what role they are intended to play and how they are prepared are dealt with in what follows.
- 3) The metropolitan region: what the physical pattern of the Bay region metropolis should be is a recurrent question in the histories. While the term metropolis is at times used interchangeably with region, metropolitan area, or metropolitan region, they all refer to large urban areas with (at least) one main central city, and which "function" primarily due to their commuting patterns. The concepts that are discussed as being the basis of such metropolises are meant to apply to areas of several millions of people; the Census Bureau's definition that metropolitan is anything that has over fifty thousand persons with one or more surrounding communities is not meant.

Despite this, there remains in the paper some ambivalence over the usage of metropolis, region, and metropolitan. I plead guilty to such a charge, and only point out that nowhere in the field of urban planning has there yet developed a coherent theory of the metropolitan region as an

aggregation of urban and non-urban land uses: the British have made the best attempt - we in America have barely tried. In any case, the type of environment that is proposed as a desirable goal by a metropolitan general physical plan is an issue here.

4) The approach to planning the metropolis: this to me is the core of the issues raised in this paper - how does a professional city (metropolitan) planner go about the task of influencing the future growth and development of an urban region? What questions are asked: what things are posed as matters for conscious, deliberate policy decisions?

The origin of my concern with this issue came from a long-developing conviction that cities, and thus metropolitan regions, should at some point stop expanding their physical boundaries. In deliberating about this, it seemed that much of what we do as city planning is merely the management of whatever trends seem to be coming. While this is discussed further in the conclusions, I offer a - to me - profound observation by F. J. Osborn as a means of better describing one view of the concept of approach:

Desire and will first, then provisional design, and then the survey of site and resources to find out how what is intended can be done. Today, there are many people, thinking themselves 'scientific' who would reverse this order and try to divine what ought to be from a study of what is. Piling around themselves mountains of research material, they become so impressed by refinements of economics and social interaction that have led to the existing array of cities that it begins to seem an impiety to cut across the exquisite complex of cause and effect by the exercise of crude human will. 'Whosoever discredits analogy,' said Emerson, 'and requires heaps of facts, before any theories can be attempted has no poetic power, and nothing original or beautiful will ever be produced by him.'

I have characterized this approach to planning as "willful", and contrasted it with "management" as the other pole. While I cannot claim to have therefore created anything new or remarkable, I believe it is a distinction that can provide a structure to discussion of metropolitan plan-

ning issues. I have attempted to employ it in looking at the different metropolitan planning efforts in the San Francisco Bay Area and elsewhere.

Given this content, there are several procedural notes that bear mentioning. First, there are numerous sections of the histories which would normally be footnoted by references, but which are not. The type of research materials available in preparing those histories - largely official files of minutes, correspondence and reports - did not lend themselves to such footnoting, except as cited. In addition, in the interests of allowing interviewees to be as candid as discretion and recollection would allow them to, I chose to synthesize their observations into my interpretation of the events. As a result, those interviewed have had little control over the use of their knowledge, but at the same time are not to be held accountable for any mistaken or unfair interpretations.

A second observation is that while the scope of the research for this work was extensive, it was not exhaustive. There was, due to time pressure, little opportunity to receive comments from those interviewed on the material in its written form. Also, the events covered here are so numerous and diverse that it was not possible to investigate all of them thoroughly. Nonetheless, the description of the preparation of the ABAG regional plan is as far as I have been able to understand it, a fairly complete account. Time and review will certainly bring changes, but I believe the basis to be here.

Thirdly, material which has been quoted is identified by both single-spacing and footnoting; those places where my text is single-spaced have no such footnotes.

In closing, I would like to acknowledge what all writers must - my debt to others for their time and efforts.

Those interviewed, particularly James Hickey, were extremely generous with their time and without that I would not have been able to complete this. Peter Peel was also of very great help - it was through him that I was allowed to paw through the cobwebs of the Hotel Claremont basement in search of the ABAG files for the period covered in the paper: they were invaluable in attempting to reconstruct an almost forgotten sequence of events.

However, my greatest debt is to my committee chairman, Jack Kent. His influence on my thinking will be evident to those who know him, but more important than that was the support he gave me in writing this thesis; as an editor, as a resource and as a friend, he has been invaluable, and I thank him.

Except for a quotation in one section, Jack's role in the events that finally led to the preparation of the Regional Plan is not discussed in detail. While this was not an oversight, it must be mentioned that it was Jack who provided the impetus for the first Planning Directors Committee; who was a guiding force in developing the Telesis statement and the 1954 and 1956 statements on regional planning; and who significantly affected ABAG, particularly in the early and mid-sixties. Those desiring a more complete description of his role in these events are referred to Woo's work on file in the University's Environmental Design library.

In addition to Jack, I also want to thank the other two members of my committee - Stanley Scott of the Institute of Governmental Studies, and Allan Jacobs - for their patience and assistance.

Finally, I owe another very large debt to my typist, Diann Miller, who put in long hours making this whole thing legible. When the dead-

lines came, and the material was handwritten she remained competent and cheerful - a major feat.

Chapter One: METROPOLITAN PLANS AND PLANNING 1900-1945

The Beginnings

The emergence of metropolitan planning in the United States started with the preparation and publication of Daniel Burnham's Plan of Chicago in 1909. Coming at the peak of the City Beautiful movement, the Plan developed into a symbol for this new scale of planning, for its predominant design approach, and above all for Burnham's own philosophy:

Make no little plans, they have no magic to stir men's blood and probably themselves will not be realized: Make big plans; aim high in hope and work, remembering that a noble, logical diagram once recorded will never die, but long after we are gone will be a living thing asserting itself with growing intensity.¹

The power of this oft-repeated quote became part of the incipient metropolitan planning efforts - in no small measure due to Burnham's personal influence on those who later guided the more significant of such plans in the 1920's.²

The concepts which the Chicago Plan put forth and which were the basis for its influence were simple ones: a metropolitan region existed, and was defined primarily by transportation patterns; roadways should consequently be planned to function as a hierarchial system sustaining the central city; and an outer chain of forest preserves should be established and maintained to provide a boundary to urban expansion.

The Plan came under heavy criticism, its detractors justifiably pointing to its aggrandizement of civic design, the failure to meet the pressing social needs of the poor, and the dominance of the business interests who sponsored it - an issue which was to be a recurrent one throughout most of the attempts at metropolitan planning in the 1920's.

To understand the problems of metropolitan planning in the 1920's one must look first to the pattern of urbanization that was then occurring. By 1920, the nation's population would officially be over fifty per cent urban; the census confirmed what the trends had indicated - in-migration

from rural areas was occurring at a tremendous rate. The causes of the urbanization came from the postwar economic resurgence, but the effects of that urbanization are more pertinent to the question of how metropolitan planning developed.

Coupled with increasing affluence, the surge to the cities produced the first wave of significant extensive suburbanization. Corresponding jumps in the rate of automobile ownership acted to increase mobility, and this in turn led to the development of large new roadway systems. The urban pattern became one of large cities being increasingly based on centralized business and financial activities, with smaller suburbs around them. The emerging employment relationships linked the suburbs and the larger, "parent" cities, the developing road systems reinforcing this by facilitating commuting from the less compact suburbs.

Local governments, however, seemed left behind in this new, interdependent set of linkages. Coupled with big city "imperialism", resulting tensions were created:

The metropolitan perspective of mayors and councilmen of the older centers seldom rose above self-interest. Invariably they viewed 'the proper development' of the suburban belt as being primarily for the benefit of the parent city. Their brand of metropolitanism repelled the suburbs, but the suburbs themselves were incapable of governmental cooperation.³

But these problems only highlighted the larger problem: the need for metropolitan organization and planning could no longer be ignored.

If the political jurisdictions were finding it difficult to accept the need for metropolitan planning, at least two other groups quickly grasped the advantage of larger scale approaches to city planning and development to their economic activities; governmental jurisdictions were not the barrier to them that they were to local officials. The second group was a much smaller one, composed primarily of visionary planners

who, like Burnham, understood the city as a functional entity transcending traditional boundaries, or who, like MacKaye, saw the new development trends at an even larger scale.

The relationships that were established between city planning and economic interests in preparing the metropolitan plans of the 1920's were never simple. However, two themes dominate the plans and studies they produced. First, the sponsorship of that planning work was mainly through underwriting of its costs by the business interests; it was predictable that many of the recommendations of the plans would meet the expectations of those sponsors. It should be noted that this is not to say that the value of the plans was necessarily diminished thereby - rather the plans were compromises between two groups who saw mutual benefit in working with each other.

Secondly, the plans that were produced were extra-governmental. They had no force as public policy, and could therefore be as limited - or unlimited - in scope, imagination and purpose as their sponsors and drafters desired them to be. Metropolitan planning in the 1920's was, due to the inability of local governments to cooperate effectively, almost always a civic activity; its effectiveness then came to depend on how well its products met the needs of those who would have the power to effect the plan's recommendations.

Three Efforts - Los Angeles, Chicago, New York

Among the many regional planning efforts that were attempted in the 1920's, the Los Angeles County Regional Planning Commission was the only "official" body created to perform metropolitan planning. Established in 1922 through the work of Gordon Whitnall, the Commission was an inspiration for later efforts in San Francisco and elsewhere.¹ As an advisory body composed of local officials, the Commission had no powers, but was

to study metropolitan problems and act as a forum for cooperative planning efforts.

However, Los Angeles in the early twenties was volatile - changes in the urban pattern due to the effects of massive in-migration were demanding immediate responses. Consequently, the Commission became inundated with administrative tasks, mainly subdivision reviews. Its plan-making responsibilities simply were never exercised. The failure to develop according to an agreed upon general plan in Los Angeles became a warning to other metropolitan areas, yet one that went unheeded. It was also a sign of the type of effort metropolitan planning would require: choices would never be made clear if planning became administration; and voluntary cooperation was an uncertain base for supporting strong metropolitan planning. But these lessons, too, would not be learned by other areas.

The Chicago experience of the 1920's was meant to build on Burnham's earlier plan - one of Burnham's sons even became the director of the citizen-based Regional Planning Association. However, the RPA's strategy was this time based on the development of coordination among local governments, rather than the continuing elaboration of a regional plan.

Most of this work centered on the expansion of the area's highways and forest system. But the continuing problem of developing a set of local plans which would harmoniously complement an overall metropolitan plan was not resolved; Chicago was left with only Burnham's pioneering, but problematic effort to be a guide for its future development.

By far the most elaborate - and expensive - attempt to do regional planning was that associated with the New York Regional Plan. Mainly through the work of a Burnham-inspired Charles Norton, the Russell Sage Foundation undertook sponsorship of the planning work in 1921. Through the Committee on Regional Plan for New York and its Environs, the Foundation

allocated a million dollars to the preparation of the documents, the eight volumes being completed between 1927 and 1931.

The primary architect of the plan's contents was Thomas Adams. Having worked for the Canadian government as its housing and planning advisor, Adams was an Englishman who brought with him his own mixture of philosophical understanding and pragmatism. Regional and state planning, he felt, were essential to any effort to improve the conditions of cities. However, only plans prepared in gradual steps and with the expectation of only gradual fulfillment were now desirable at the regional level; Adams' sense of metropolitan political reality led him to avoid a more visionary or willful approach to plan preparation.

The Regional Plan for New York (RPNY) covered an area of some 5500 square miles, and a population of some 9,000,000. Most of the proposals for the area were summed up in an extensive set of plan diagrams in The Graphic Regional Plan volume. Consistent with Adams' belief, the proposals were intended to be immediately practical for the local governments; "Either they [the local governments] would find it practical and properly respectful of local sentiment, or they would disregard it and render the work of the planners useless."⁴

But soon after the Plan was published it came under attack - particularly by Lewis Mumford:

One must finally judge the Regional Plan not by its separate details, but by its drift. . . The net result of this Pauline effort to be all things to all men is to neutralize the effect of any particular proposal.⁵

Mumford's critique of the plan was an extensive one, and his singling out of the lack of imaginability of the massive Plan's proposals was a significant action. More than being just a flaw, the failure of the Plan to offer clear choices about alternative futures was symptomatic of a larger failure - a failure of the planners involved to challenge trends

and call for limits on city sizes:

The city in its complete sense, a physical organization, an institutional process, an esthetic reality, an incorporation of groups, cannot be increased indefinitely in size; for to be effective, the nuclear institutions must, beyond a certain point in growth, split up again into units conceived on the human scale and responsive to human needs and requirements.

It may be difficult to define the limits of metropolitan concentration: but one cannot doubt that they exist.⁶

In not confronting these issues, in accepting all future population increases, and more importantly, in not providing an understandable direction for future action, the plan became more than deficient:

No one can confront the imposing stuff of authorities and experts that assisted them without a feeling of genuine deference. If they are wrong, who can be right? If they are muddled, who can be clear?

But it is precisely in that broader aspect of regional survey and regional planning that the report is fundamentally weak: it not merely fails to demonstrate valid principles and useful methods of procedures, but by its show of authority it creates barriers against anyone else's arriving at them.⁷

The danger of precedent set by an "imposing" effort was combining with an inability of people other than the planners to analyze what immense amounts of effort had compiled. The result was to obscure the direction of public policy that might be based on the plan - a direction would be given by the complexity, but it might never be understandable. It would be a blind path to which those who followed it would commit themselves, without knowing the choices or consequences.

Mumford's critique took Adams to task for resigning himself to accept "factors of city growth as outside human foresight and control", but Adams himself was not content to let it pass. Describing Mumford as "an esthetic-sociologist, who has a religion that is based on high ideals, but is unworkable,"⁸ Adams relied on his afore-mentioned position - a plan would become useless unless it addressed "reality".

The RPNY was, to a large extent, a self-fulfilling prophecy; its

many of its recommendations were fated to occur with or without it. Under the Plan's policies, New York could only continue to be what it had grown to be - and would probably grow worse.

London and the Greenbelt: Abercrombie's Plan

In 1944, Patrick Abercrombie published the Greater London Plan. With its bold proposals for rebuilding London on a new, decentralized scale and limiting the city's spread with a permanent, ten-mile wide greenbelt, the Plan was a landmark. For planners in the United States, the fact that Abercrombie's effort was done amidst the devastation that World War II had brought to England created an additional impact: "These plans had an authority commending respect even among those inclined to denigrate planning."⁹

Yet the proposals in the Greater London Plan were something more: they were the culmination of a tradition, the expression of an enormously powerful set of ideas. The main source of those ideas had been Ebenezer Howard's remarkable work, To-morrow, published in 1898. Later reappearing under its more popular name of Garden Cities of Tomorrow, the book was a unique synthesis of sociology, urban planning and humanist philosophy. The proposals which it set forth were a combination of different ideas, taken both from continental European planning, and from utopian philosophers and writers such as Robert Owen; as Howard himself noted, the book served mainly to bring together these ideas in a "unique combination of proposals."

The basic concepts of Howard's view of towns and the landscapes they occupied were the following:

- 1) Cities and people survived best in towns of limited size and density; after a certain point, new growth must be channeled to new towns.
- 2) A city needed to be related to its surrounding lands by having a defined urban edge and, as a result, a permanently reserved (agricultural) belt around that urban area.

3) Such new town sites as were needed should be in public or quasi-public ownership; pre-planning and the benefits of the public receiving increases in land value could then result.

Howard made numerous other proposals for garden-city design, but these were the main ideas that affected planning as a metropolitan level activity. For a number of reasons,¹⁰ it was these ideas that became the philosophical basis for almost all of the British efforts at planning their metropolitan regions, most notably in the proposals for London.

While there is a very lengthy and complex history surrounding efforts to plan the London region, the most notable result of those efforts was, and has been, the 1944 Greater London Plan. And of the proposals made in that plan, it is probably the greenbelt that has been most significant.

Although Osborn¹¹ has traced the idea of greenbelts back to biblical times, in England it was first Howard, then Unwin, and finally Abercrombie who successfully argued for it, and finally achieved its effectuation. In so doing, there were generally four recognized functions for such a greenbelt:

First, and foremost, it was "a means of preventing inordinate growth of a town beyond the point where its facilities and services became overloaded;"¹²

Second, it was a resource for food production close-in to the urban areas;

Third, it was both an area for recreation needs of present inhabitants, and a reserve for increased recreational demands of future inhabitants;

Fourth, it was a setting, or as Unwin later termed it, a "backdrop," within which a city could develop "and which would maintain, close at hand, the 'fresh delights of the countryside'..."¹³

In 1933, Unwin, primarily using arguments based on the recreational uses of open space, proposed a "green girdle" for the London area. Comprising an area of approximately 65 square miles (compared with the almost 2000 square miles in the current London greenbelt), this "green girdle"

was needed for playing fields and passive recreation. But it also served another purpose:

Unwin impressed upon the Regional Committee the importance of planning the area beyond the girdle not as a limitless field of potential building land in which there were occasional stretches of open space, but as an area where settlement was distributed on a background of open land reserved temporarily or permanently from building.¹⁴

In making his proposal in these terms, Unwin was actually laying the basis for a much broader greenbelt; the first step toward that more comprehensive greenbelt was to acquire an "inner line" of open space in order to break the outward spread of the metropolis. Once this had been established, regulation and selective acquisition could fill in the remainder of the larger greenbelt.

The response to Unwin's proposals was swift - by 1936, almost 30 square miles had been acquired. Half of this was open to the public, the remainder was productive farmland. Eventually, almost four-fifths of the lands in Unwin's plan were acquired.¹⁵

The work of three important government study committees set the stage for Abercrombie's greenbelt proposal: in 1940 the Barlow Commission reported on the distribution of industrial population, and concluded that such growth needed to be restricted, particularly around London. Abercrombie, who was a member of the Commission, joined with others in presenting a minority report that urged even stronger restrictions, but the general thrust of the Commission's report was clear - growth through physical expansion of cities needed to be halted beyond a certain size.

The Uthwatt Committee, reporting in 1942 on the problems of compensation and "betterment", added to this by proposing a series of strong land use controls involving charges for development and the payment of compensation for certain areas denied development.

The third group, the Scott Committee on Land Utilization, added to the above by coming out strongly for large-scale preservation of agricultural lands. It was possible, they argued, that agricultural lands should be protected regardless of cost - they were a priceless national asset, in addition to being productive economic units.

Another contribution of the Scott report was the famous footnote on greenbelts summarized by Thomas:

A greenbelt, where no building or construction development was to be allowed, and would be used by a planning authority when a town had reached a maximum or optimum size.¹⁶

It was this direction of thought that Abercrombie adopted, and which became the basis for much of what is now the London greenbelt. In 1946, the Plan was adopted by the appropriate Ministry as policy. In 1947, the Town and County Planning Act was passed, providing the strong planning powers needed to implement the Abercrombie proposals. By 1950, specific plans for the greenbelt were completed leading to its almost complete establishment by the early sixties - just as the San Francisco Bay Area was beginning the development of its first regional plan.

The English metropolitan planning experience has been juxtaposed to the events in the United States as a means of providing contrast. Most of the results of their planning have come from the starting point of asking, what should the size of towns be, and how should they be disposed in relation to the landscape? In contrast, American planning thought has not had as clear a direction - the most basic city planning questions are almost always displaced by either the need to meet immediate problems or the desire to be more informed prior to making assertions about such questions.

For better or worse, the result of this tendency has been plans and

institutions that do not seem to answer our social and physical needs. Although the right question is by no means the panacea for our urban problems, to develop those questions and to consciously and deliberately go about making plans which offer clear attempts at answering them is a positive beginning:

If we know the sort of towns we want, we shall be disposed, indeed we shall be impelled, to develop any governmental machinery necessary to produce them. [In Britain] we did not start with a craze for a planning machine and then look around for a job for the machine to do. That is why I think the British experience is worth study.

Osborn's comments apply equally to the question of planning for metropolitan regions - if we know the kind of metropolis we want, we can go about achieving it. In Britain, the legacy of Howard and others provided much of the basis for what was desired; the plans and institutions that followed were largely expressions of those ideas.

It is against this background that the history of metropolitan planning efforts in the San Francisco Bay Area will now be explored.

Chapter Two: EARLY BEGINNINGS 1946-60

The evolution of regional planning in the San Francisco Bay Area has resulted from the interplay of two opposing forces which shift constantly as the metropolis grows, yet which always maintain their tension. A noted writer on the region's development has described that history as "a paradoxical one, in which, as in a kind of morality play, the forces of division struggle with the forces of unity."¹ The San Francisco Bay itself stands as the pre-eminent symbol of that struggle, he notes, providing the cohesion of a marine ecosystem and a spectacular visual resource, yet at the same time creating the opportunity for the scatteration of urban functions that has so fragmented the political unity of the metropolis.

But the effort to establish regional planning is also a product of the evolving form and composition of the metropolis, of the need to attain a "critical mass" of functioning linkages and popular perception based on the pattern and intensity of physical development in the region. Therefore the question of planning the metropolis cannot stand totally separate from the desired result of that planning; planning process cannot be divorced from the vision of the metropolis that its practitioners wish to afford the region's inhabitants.

The first explicit attempt to do such planning in the Bay Area came with the establishment of the San Francisco Regional Plan Association in 1925, a shortlived effort that failed in 1928. Begun before city planning had more than a bare foothold on the public consciousness, the RPA was only able to produce an inspirational legacy.²

A second attempt came from a different source; in 1935, the planning commissions of seven counties resolved to try to get WPA funding for a regional survey. The funding depended on the counties forming an official regional association, but the same lack of experience with planning and

regionalism prevented the realization of the need for such an effort and the project was given up.³

In 1941, a third push to establish regional planning was attempted through a proposal of State Planning Board for a Bay Area Planning District. But the distrust of the local governments towards state proposals, the exclusion of incorporated areas from the proposed district's jurisdiction, and again, the lack of familiarity with city planning at the local level worked to prevent the passage of the proposal.⁴

It was with World War II and its immediate after-effects that the region truly began to show an awareness of its emergence as an interdependent collection of land uses and economies. The war had brought with it not only a vast increase in population, but had also provided special emergency mechanisms for the transportation of that population. When the war ended, those special transportation provisions were also ended, and the demand for a replacement began immediately. The city of San Francisco itself responded with proposals for what was later to become the Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission and, like many other cities and counties in the region, intensified its own transit and traffic planning efforts.

Also of importance for the emerging regionalism was the formation of the Bay Area Council in 1945 as both a promotional and a coordinating body for areawide business interests; the Council would play an influential role in the efforts to achieve various forms of regional planning and governance.

THE TELESIS STATEMENT ON REGIONAL PLANNING

But for the question of metropolitan physical planning, some of the most basic concepts were getting their Bay Area footholds through the work of a committee of the Telesis organization. Composed primarily of city planners from San Francisco, the committee was established in 1948

to develop a statement as part of a proposed Telesis exhibition. Aware of the bold proposals of the 1944 Abercrombie Plan for London Metropolitan Region that called for population dispersion, new towns, and a broad green-belt to contain growth, the committee set about drafting a statement of metropolitan planning principles and objectives for the Bay Area, as the first step towards the development of a metropolitan planning program. One year later, the document was completed and portions incorporated in a Telesis exhibition, The Next Million People .

The statement that the committee drafted is a valuable one both for its specific content and for the manner in which it approached the planning problem of preparing for great forces of change; the goals and approaches expressed in it are representative of one of the major themes of this paper - the concept of willful planning.

The positions developed by the Telesis group were forthrightly acknowledged as subjective by their authors: "If our concepts and objectives are not fundamentally in accord with those of the people of the metropolitan Bay Area, we know that our. . . principles will not be accepted."⁵ And to that acknowledgement they applied their own view of willful planning:

But if those concepts are accepted - and we believe they are - then present principles and practices can and will be changed and the present trends of urban growth and development in the Bay Area will gradually be altered so that they will show that we are building a better and ever improving living and working environment - an urban setting for human life that will some day match the beauty and grandeur of the Bay Area which nature has provided.⁶

The more distinctive of the approximately thirty specific statements in the paper were those calling for the conscious reorganization of the metropolitan "core" (San Francisco, and the Oakland/central East Bay), new towns of limited size, a definite urban-rural boundary of open space, public ownership of newly developing areas, a reduction of the journey to

work, and a Regional Planning Commission.

The proposals represented a call for comprehensive regional planning - not just for transportation - at a time when there was little regional planning for any metropolitan region in the U.S., and little theory of either what to plan, or how to plan for it.

For the Bay Area, the statement had a special significance due to its effect on the small group of then-practicing planners; it was a catalyst for the development of many of the basic metropolitan planning concepts which would make their appearance five years later in the BARTC study. The process of developing, as well as the content developed, shaped much of the thinking of these planners, many of whom would remain at the forefront of the metropolitan regional planning effort throughout the sixties and seventies. The proposals also represented a reaction against the single-element planning that was then so prevalent; instead of "tinkering", they were a holistic view of the metropolis.

Additionally, they represented a belief that a regional plan would be developed within the near future by a regional planning agency; such action was needed to confront the decentralization that was seen as being so destructive to the compact, well-functioning metropolis of the Bay region. It was this belief that found its way into much of the thinking of those who in 1953 began work on a general metropolitan plan element for the Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission, and those who were members of the already-established Bay Area Planning Directors Committee (PDC).

The relationship between the work of the PDC and that of the BARTC general plan staff is an interconnected one; both were mutual influences, yet each represented a different piece of the regional planning thought that was then developing in the Bay Area: the work of the PDC was based

on broad regional goals, and regional governmental organization; the BARTC staff through its general plan proposal dealt more with the specific content of regional planning. Since the two groups are both highly important parts of Bay Area metropolitan planning history, they are treated separately.

THE PLANNING DIRECTORS COMMITTEE

The Bay Area Planning Directors Committee had emerged as an informal group in 1947. It was composed of approximately 15 professional planners, mainly from counties; city planning had still not become a widespread governmental activity. In that same year the Committee established a liason with the newly-formed Bay Area Council; while remaining primarily a forum for the discussion of common interests among the directors, the Committee also played a informal advisory role to the Council.

The role of the PDC in the BARTC study was a reflection of the undeveloped nature of metropolitan regional planning at the time; since there was as yet no institutional body responsible for planning at the regional level, a vacuum was left to be filled by those who perceived regional needs and responsibilities - in this case the BAC and the PDC. It was realized by the BARTC staff and others that if any regional plan were to be carried out in the absence of an appropriate governing body, it would require the active support of at least the professional city planners so that it might be integrated into local planning efforts.

Although there was the possibility that the same lack of regional perspective that existed at much of the local governmental level would similarly exist for the planning directors, such turned out to not be the case. The main reason for this lay in the personal views of the more prominent and active planners at the time; philosophically, they were almost all committed regionalists. Particularly those planners in the

Telesis group, but also many who had recently graduated from the new University of California planning program were strong supporters of such a level of planning.

This regionalism was brought out clearly in two documents that the Committee initiated, through a conference of Bay Area planning commissioners. The two reports were serial, the first addressing the need for regional planning in the Bay Area, the second following up with a proposal for an agency to carry out that planning.

The first study, Regional Planning Needs for the San Francisco Bay Area, was published in 1954 with the financial support of the Bay Area Council, and was written by Van Beuren Stanbery in cooperation with several key members of the PDC.

Stanbery's approach to both planning and questions of urban life was exemplified in a passage written by him prior to his work on the PDC report:

It is proposed that a study be made of the tangible and intangible effects of large cities on their inhabitants - the qualities and attitudes engendered by urban life for the purpose of recognizing and preserving these values in urban planning. . .

The noticeable tendency of certain types of urban replanning to stratify the population according to income levels or type of occupation; to break up the metropolis into a series of separate and somewhat independent communities; to force people to mingle with their neighbors in unwanted familiarity; - may destroy the human values mentioned. . . Intelligent urban planning requires that the desirable qualities be always kept in mind. . . in programs for improving land use and constructing physical facilities, especially in planning for neighborhoods and communities within large urban areas. Properly analyzed and developed, they might become valuable criteria for urban planning.⁷

The use of this strongly normative view of planning represented a determination to keep the offering of a clear and preferred choice about future conditions continually visible in any planning effort. (Stanbery also worked on the BARTC study population projections - his work provided him an opportunity to link these views and the ones he developed for the

1954 PDC report with the first efforts to practice comprehensive regional planning in the Bay Area.)

The 1954 Regional Planning Needs report itself dealt with a definition of regional planning, current problems in the Bay Area and responses to them, and the development of the planning capabilities of local government. It was a conceptual rather than a quantitative analysis of regional needs, and was intended as a means to begin educating officials and citizens to regional issues.

The basic principle that the document saw as the key to regional planning was that that Bay Area functioned as a complex set of interdependent parts; beyond a certain point, forces leading to decentralization would diminish the quality of life that did or could exist. Hence, the main task of regional planning was to consciously and deliberately encourage clustering and compaction, and in so doing identify and counter "the causes of these dispersive trends."⁸

Physical planning at a regional level was needed to successfully accomplish the goal of preserving the quality of the region because of the inability of local governments to act in the interests of the area as a whole, and the similar difficulty of the various special purpose agencies to act comprehensively. Therefore, regional planning was needed to address both the subjective content goal of clustering, and the procedural goal of resolving conflicts between and with local jurisdictions.

The main tool for accomplishing this would be through the use of a regional plan which Stanbery saw as being long-range and general, dealing with the physical development and organization of the metropolitan whole - a product of a continuous planning process, rather than just an initial effort. The plan was to be only advisory, therefore necessitating the

need for the future regional planning structure to develop and implement the plan through complex interaction and negotiation with local governments. In level of detail, the plan would be an "outline" - a framework which would be given greater detail by local government and by the continuing development of regional planning.

The relationship of the plan to policy and decision-making was to be encompassed in the agency proposal of the second report.

Written in 1956 by William Doebele under the direction of a sub-committee of the PDC, and financed this time by voluntary contributions from local planning commissions, the second report built on the concepts that had been set forth in the first volume: regional planning was needed to maintain the functional cohesion of the Bay Area in the face of large anticipated increases in population and economic growth; such planning should be based on an advisory general plan; regional planning was supplemental to, rather than a supplanting of local government.

This latter qualification of regional planning as advisory was an important one, and was based on the absence of a regional government; there being no elected legislative body to be accountable to, planning could therefore not be given directive authority. It was this same issue that was to arise continually in the debates of the sixties over the role of planning in the various proposed governing bodies, and in the Association of Bay Area Governments.

The specific legislative proposal in the report called for an agency modelled somewhat along the lines of the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District Act of 1955, and the proposed Bay Area Rapid Transit District legislation. It called for a 26-member executive board, composed mainly of local elected officials but also including 8 appointed citizens; limited taxing authority to fund its activities; and through a professional staff,

the preparation and maintenance of an advisory regional plan.

The PDC had not intended for the proposal to be a formal legislative one - its function was viewed as educative, more along the lines of the contemporary ALI model codes. It was published in bill form by a Bay Area legislator as Assembly Bill 1647 in the 1957 session of the state legislature, but there was no effort made to enact it - visibility was the only goal. Nevertheless, what did emerge as a result was enabling legislation allowing the formation of bi-county planning districts.

THE BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION

The BARTC was the result of both the 1946-50 San Francisco transit studies and the urgings of the Bay Area Council. In response to these, the State Legislature in 1951 appropriated \$50,000 for a preliminary one-year study of what longer-range planning efforts were needed to meet the rapid transit demands of the Bay Area. It was one of the primary recommendations of this report that a general plan for urban development in the region be the basis of any transportation proposals resulting from a longer-term study. The study to develop that plan began when the BARTC contract was let in 1953. The primary consultants, Parsons, Brinkerhoff, McDonald and Hall, subcontracted the design and supervision of the general planning program to Howard, Adams and Greely of Boston, who in turn selected Lawrence Livingston, Jr. as their project manager.

When published in early 1956, the general plan portion of the BARTC report portrayed a deliberate attempt to shape the future form and function of the metropolitan Bay Area. It called for a city-centered concept of development, with the rapid transit system providing linkages, all as part of a conscious effort to preserve the cohesive, functional nature of the metropolis.

When the Commission's planning work began in late 1953, there were several initial constraints: first, since the contract was limited to two years, the planning staff viewed their effort as one of creating only an "outline" plan - that format was also seen as appropriate due to the lack of data available for what the staff saw as necessary for a full general planning effort; finally, such a format was necessary because the political acceptability of the plan to the other Bay Area planners would be greater in an outline form. Since implementation would only result from the cooperation and support of those local government planning agencies, the question of acceptability was a strong influence - a circumstance that the later ABAG planning program would also have to confront.

The general plan of the metropolitan region published in the BARTC study in 1956 was more than just a component of the rapid transit plan - it was a symbol in its own right, representing the region's first plan, and thus a fulfillment of much of the work of the Telesis group and others over the preceding ten years.

The rapid transit orientation of the planning study imposed a second limitation: the plan would be focused primarily on questions of urban development, with its main concerns being the location of population and employment. Questions that would become important to organizing the form of the metropolis in the sixties would deal more with environmental resources, particularly open space, but these were not strong factors in the fifties.

In all of this, the BARTC staff tended toward the view that their planning effort was only a forerunner of that which would be done by a governmentally-based agency in the near future - little did they imagine that twenty years later, there would still be no such regional body.

They therefore felt that any thing other than an outline plan would be presumptuous, and that their effort should be directed toward establishing the initial metropolitan general plan goals and main elements for that future agency/government.

Specific goals were developed at the beginning of the study and centered around the very basic question posed by Livingston: how to structure the metropolis in such a way as to enhance and preserve its functions? The staff, Livingston felt, agreed that it was "highly desirable to retain and protect the kind of metropolitan development which can uniquely provide the social, cultural and headquarters facilities" for the Bay Area.⁹

It was but a short step from this view to the organizing concepts that had been developed a year earlier by Stanbery in the Regional Planning Needs study; the Bay Area metropolis must not become dispersed lest it lose its social, cultural and economic vitality. It was, in fact, this report which the BARTC staff used to help develop the initial range of policy objectives of the plan, and of course Stanbery was the ever-present link between them. Having made these preliminary statements, the staff then conferred with local planning directors in order to develop the list into a more broadly representative set of goals and objectives. The final policy statement was developed after consultations with Howard and Adams.

In the plan, the following represented those substantive concepts:

- 1) The choice facing the region was whether to continue the present trend toward dispersal, or to actively develop a "nucleation" concept that would be a challenge to it. The choice made was to call for concentration of services, residences, and employment into a hierarchy of compact city-centers, supported by rail transit.

- 2) As a result of (1), efforts to preserve and enhance that hierarchy

of existing city centers should be of primary importance, rather than concentrating resources on suburban expansion.

3) Time and access standards were employed as criteria for urban expansion; journey to work should be limited to forty-five minutes, and access to major open space should be within a fifteen minute drive.

4) Population projections for the region were made, but these were trend-following only at the regional level; distribution proposals consistent with the nucleation goals were made rather than solely accepting growth in the projection-indicated sub-areas of the region.

The plan itself did not challenge or attempt to decide on questions of population or community size per se; the standards used in the study had the effect of offering a possible constraint, but were too loosely formulated to be sufficient as a means of limiting growth to a desired level.

Although the referral process to local planning directors tended to pose a potential constraint to the boldness of any specific policy objective, the plan was a strong statement. To be sure, it was not a plan of a government, nor was it in any way legally binding. But it attempted to set a direction for the continuing regional planning movement; it suggested that the functioning and growth of the man-made metropolis was not beyond the capability of its inhabitants to change it, and it proposed a particular future that would be the basis of such deliberate actions.

The city-centered general plan that supported the rapid transit concept can thus be seen as not just the predetermined result of a legislatively mandated study, but as an expression of a fairly cohesive set of planning concepts that had become linked by the many interactions of the individuals involved. As such, it was a strong force in encouraging and developing the emerging consciousness of the desirability and necessity of regional planning

for the San Francisco Bay Area, as well as a first glimpse of its substantive direction. At a time of widespread metropolitan decentralization, it was a call for a much different future.

Three years later in 1958 the Department of Commerce through the work of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, produced a study that was an ominous counterpoint to the willful BARTC plan. Entitled The Future Development of the San Francisco Bay Area, 1960-2020, the report projected population trends as an ever-growing phenomenon, leading to an anticipated population of 14.4 million by the year 2020. Using a series of maps based on ten-year increments, urban land use was also portrayed as ever-expanding, with the 2020 map looking as if a careless draftsman had spilled the orange ink of urbanization over most all of the Bay Area.

The lack of any consideration for the quality and function of the projected system of land uses prevented the report from becoming a permanent fixture in Bay Area planning, yet the images produced by the portrayal of unlimited population growth and urban sprawl served to begin educating a populace that was growing more and more aware of the region as something to care about as a whole.

When the sixties began, these images became more and more real as the Santa Clara Valley orchards were chopped up by leap-frogging sprawl, auto-induced smog increased, and more transportation problems were created by the continuing growth in suburban population. These were met with a variety of responses, including the Golden Gate Authority proposal, a Governor's Commission on Metropolitan Area Problems, and another proposal for a regional planning agency.

It was out of these events and with this background that the Association of Bay Area Governments was to emerge in 1961.

Part Two, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABAG REGIONAL PLANNING

The Regional Plan of 1967

The 1967 Regional Plan was a landmark document in the history of the ABAG region. It was the first time that the ABAG had produced a comprehensive regional plan. The plan was developed by the ABAG Regional Planning Committee, which was established in 1964. The plan was a result of a series of studies and consultations with the local government and the public. The plan was a comprehensive document that covered a wide range of issues, including land use, transportation, housing, and environmental protection. The plan was a landmark document in the history of the ABAG region, and it was a major step towards the development of a comprehensive regional plan.

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Chapter Three: THE ABAG REGIONAL PLANNING PROGRAM 1961-1967

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Part One: THE BEGINNINGS OF ABAG AND REGIONAL PLANNING

The Formation of ABAG

As the fifties came to a close, there was an increase in activities that in one form or another were attempting to catalyze a further establishment of regional perspectives through formal institutions. But if it was growing inevitable that regionalism was to be institutionalized, there was an unbelievably diverse set of views on how that would occur and who would control the result.

To tie, then, the emergence of the Association of Bay Area Governments to any single event would be to ignore the very large number of linkages, undercurrents, and interdependencies that were the political framework of the political - and physical - metropolis of the Bay Area. Nevertheless, two major factors existed, one allowing for, and one forcing the establishment of the association in 1961.

It had been a tradition in the Bay Area for there to be periodic gatherings of the elected officials of the two levels of local government - the cities and the counties. From these meetings and other informal contacts a loose network of communication had grown and, to a small degree, flourished.

As the pressure for the creation of metropolitan level institutions and viewpoints grew in the late fifties, the mayors' and supervisors' conferences in the Bay Area began to ask the inevitable question: how will these movements and forces affect our interests? The answer was clearly a negative one, for they quickly acted to oppose many of the proposed regional transformations that they felt would erode their control.

Not only did they act, but they acted with strength. The associations

of city and county officials in California are political powerhouses, and have a long record of success in opposing and neutralizing legislative proposals that would lessen the authority of local governments.

So it was not surprising that it was the mayors' and supervisors' conferences that blocked the sweeping proposal for a Golden Gate Authority in the late fifties. And it is also not surprising that their most effective tactic in meeting this and the other challenges of the times was simply to institutionalize, in the form of ABAG, what had been occurring informally for the past decade - voluntary conferences.

But the choice to establish ABAG was not really a choice for the local officials - it was an only option. The force of the movement for metropolitan-level responses was such that even the local governments could only shape rather than prevent it. It was the proposal for a Golden Gate Authority that finally brought such action in the Bay Area. The roots of a regional authority for bridges, ports and highways goes back to the mid-forties to the earliest proposals of the Bay Area Council. Raised again through the state legislature in 1957, the GGA concept gathered the powerful support of business and industrial interests. However, strong as this support was, it had the cities and the counties to fight, along with the opposition of a key state legislator. By 1961, the GGA concept had run its course and joined the legislative bill graveyard in Sacramento.

In addition to the strong territoriality of local government in the Bay Area and the threat to it of the GGA, there were four other less influential factors that helped bring about the eventual formation of ABAG:

- 1) The Governor's Commission on Metropolitan Area Problems, appointed at the height of the late fifties' concern for problem solving at the metropolitan level, provided a major incentive for action. The Commission was charged with making specific recommendations for the regions of the state; its report in 1960 called for the creation, by the State, of regional planning districts throughout all of California.

Although these were eventually designated, no actions creating agencies within those areas was ever taken - the pre-emptive formation of COG's, which relied on joint-exercise of powers agreements, took place instead.

2) Another legislative proposal that was forcing action by local governments was a bill in 1959 supported by the Bay Area Planning Commissioners Federation, and based on the 1956 Planning Directors Committee proposal. Later withdrawn, the bill served as a further reminder that some formal regional organization was becoming inevitable - the only question was who would control it.

3) More pressures came as the federal government began deepening its own involvement in metropolitan problems in the early sixties. First, through the establishment of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1959, and second, through open space grant provisions of the Housing Act of 1961, the national government started what would later become a program to force the formation and operation of metropolitan planning bodies.

4) Throughout all of this was the desire of a small group of local government officials to establish a regional association of governments. It was this group which, when the necessity of forming a voluntary association of governments became clear to all local government interests, played a major role in establishing the Association of Bay Area Governments. Particularly active were Claude Hutchinson, Mayor of Berkeley and Wesley McClure, the City Manager of San Leandro.

In May, 1960 a joint conference of city and county representatives approved the proposal for a council of governments that had been earlier developed by several of their members, and in January 1961, the Association of Bay Area Governments was officially established.¹ However, of the almost ninety cities and nine counties eligible to join, the starting membership totaled forty-nine cities and four counties; only in 1964 would the Association be inclusive of almost all of the local governments of the region. But in 1961, the membership did not even include the region's two biggest cities - San Francisco had supported the GGA, and Oakland still nursed visions of glory over her rival across the Bay.²

From the above events, three significant observations emerge relative to an examination of the role of regional planning:

1) ABAG was above all not a government; it was formed to be - and so remains - a voluntary association of local governments, split along city and county lines. As such, it had only potential power (through joint powers agreements) to act. The only actual "powers" it was ever to actually exercise stemmed from mandatory review requirements imposed by the federal government - and these were only advisory. Even this limited authority base has remained largely untouched because local governments, through their representatives to ABAG, have steadfastly avoided using the review power as a strong planning tool.

2) Following from the above, ABAG generally lacked positive leadership in asserting a regional interest; local government representatives were first and foremost responsible to their local bases - the region was, understandably, a secondary concern. This was consistent with the origins of the Association's formation.

3) Planning as conceived of by the Association was both defensive and undefined. If regional planning - and there were few who had any concept of what that activity embraced - was to be done, it was not because there was an inherent and widely accepted need to organize the struggle of the metropolis. Rather, it was a tool to pre-empt, or, where the pressure was too great, comply minimally with outside forces.

A First View of Regional Planning

ABAG's first step toward regional planning was taken in May of 1961, with the formation of the Committee on Regional Planning (later the Regional Planning Committee, or RPC) by the Executive Committee of the Association. The reason for establishing the Committee was the then-pending AB 2560, authored by Assemblyman William Rumford of Berkeley. The bill proposed a tax-financed, advisory regional planning body almost identical to that proposed in 1956.

Although the bill was not intended to be given a serious effort at passage, its demise in mid-1961 signalled the end of attempts to create a Bay Area regional planning agency as originally outlined in the 1956 Planning Directors report. General planning for the region done by an agency other than a council of governments would be a dormant concept for the next six years, until the 1967 ABAG proposal for a limited-function

Soon after meeting its charge regarding AB 2560, the RPC began looking at larger views of its task. In July of 1961, it met to explore the possibilities for ABAG's regional planning role. It was at this meeting that the Committee laid out an initial version of constraints which would be the leash against which the regional planning program would tug for the next sixteen years.

In making their proposal, the RPC was dominated by its chairman, John McInnis of San Rafael. McInnis was not a friend of the type of planning that had been advocated by the planning directors through Van Beuren Stanbery in the fifties. Although he would in time be educated by the yet-to-be-hired planning staff and his own experiences on the committee, and would support a strong regional plan in 1970, in 1961 his approach showed an appalling lack of understanding of the complexities inherent in even small scale urban planning activities.

As summarized in McInnis' report of September, 1964, the RPC's recommendations portrayed the desired role of planning and the regional plan as follows:

The "proper" framework for planning was that of a cooperative undertaking; a regional planning district was therefore not acceptable.

The planning function was seen as advisory at the regional level, and could only serve as a guide, not a basis, for decisions; however, it could provide for an areawide information base, and act to coordinate research efforts.

A paid planning staff was also not desirable; "It seems inadvisable to burden so new an organization with what would probably be heavy budget requirements."³ As a result, the use of Federal 701 planning assistance

grants was recommended against, since a commitment to an ongoing planning program was required in order to receive them.

McInnis' recommendation for carrying out regional planning was focused around a "citizen coordinator" who would "volunteer his time and efforts in bringing together and organizing the vast technical potential to be found among our present member staff personnel."⁴

As a result of the proposed organizational structure, the regional plan itself was to be a composite of local plans. In almost a premonition of the 1966 Preliminary Regional Plan format, a map showing all of the local plans was called for; but instead of being only a prefatory element in the presentation of a regionally-based plan, this composite map would "lead naturally into a self-appraisal of shortcomings and inconsistencies. . . and action based on that appraisal."⁵

Once the assembly of local general plans had been completed, and self-criticism had taken place, the role of regional planning would be "to appraise the future requirements" for physical development; one planned for the growth of a region without attempting to question the desirability from a regional standpoint of increases in population and consequent land consumption.

The report was far more a summary of McInnis' views than a consensus of committee members and professionals - although there is little indication that the other committee members disagreed with their chairman. Whether the planning directors at the time had a definitive view on the role of ABAG in regional planning is not clear; however, they too did not openly oppose McInnis' approach.

McInnis closed the report with a statement highly supportive of local

planning. Local governments "know what the physical planning job is and, by and large, have established the fact that they are determined to do it well."⁶ He would have been interested to see then what the composite maps in the 1966 Preliminary Regional Plan would show in his own county of Marin: zoning permitted medium density development of the entire county, while the general plan showed low density development for all but the most inaccessible areas. (He would also come to support a regional plan that in 1970 would show some eighty-five percent of Marin County as permanent open space - but that was to be part of his education on the RPC.)

The proposal was a clear indication of the reluctance of ABAG - and particularly John McInnis - to engage in any serious planning effort, despite a rather vacuous declaration that "the concept of regional planning in the Bay Area is sound and deserves pursuit. . ."⁷ Although much would change in the following nine months, a tone had been set.

The TAG Proposal

In late 1961, a Technical Advisory Group was formed to aid the RPC in the absence of any staff of its own. The TAG, composed mainly of planning directors, with some planning commissioners, was a surrogate for the dormant PDC. It was a means of linking local planning to a regional framework, as well as a vehicle for doing what ABAG and the RPC were unwilling to pay for.

At the December, 1961 RPC meeting, the TAG members put forward a recommendation that the RPC move from its avowed "no permanent planning function" position to support of a proposal for developing a small, permanent staff. At the meeting, it was agreed that the TAG should prepare a preliminary program and budget, and that the RPC would then attempt to "sell" it.

This sudden change in direction was largely brought about by ABAG's experience with the two actions which it had taken as its first reluctant steps toward regional planning.* In late 1961, the TAG of the RPC had recommended preparation of a regional base map, and a land use inventory map. The San Jose Planning Department performed the staff work to produce these maps, however, it was work performed without compensation (in line with the "voluntary" planning approach of the time) and required a substantial amount of time - the land use inventory map was completed in 1963.

The second action was the preparation of an inventory of regional parks and open spaces. Developed through the TAG of ABAG's Regional Recreation and Parks, this report also prepared by staff from San Jose and Santa Clara County, and was completed in mid-1962. (However, it was not published until 1963).

As small as these tasks are in terms of a regional planning program, they convinced the members of the TAG, and through them the RPC, that it would be impossible to conduct any level of regional planning without a paid staff. It is indicative of the attitudes and conditions surrounding the subject of planning for the region at that time that the committee members needed convincing; the view of region and regional planning was still an immature one, at best.

By June, 1962, the TAG had prepared its proposal for a regional planning program. Differing little from McInnis' previous statement, the TAG foresaw regional planning as still an effort to simply compile existing plans; no indication of a future direction for the regional planning function was made, other than that it would somehow "promote and encourage cooperation." The regional plan, was, of course, advisory and would only be "recommended to the cities and counties for their acceptance."⁸

Indicative of this view of regional planning were the funding propo-

sals and the overall rationale for the program proposal. The total recommended budget was \$25,000, and allowed for one planner, a half-time draftsman, and a secretary. Small as this sum was, the reluctance to appropriate it was underscored by a Committee proposal to recoup this cost by selling subscriptions to a map and advisory service; not only was the budget extremely small, the program needed to pay for itself! Unanswered by the TAG proposal was the entire issue of why ABAG should attempt to prepare a plan in the first place; what in the course of realizing a responsibility for the metropolitan region led the RPC members to desire the preparation of plan? Most likely, the push for a regional plan originated with those professional planners on the TAG. The newly emerging role of the Federal government in regional affairs was carrying an emphasis on metropolitan plans as a prerequisite for receiving certain types of funding, and the planning directors were probably more aware of this than the legislators. It seems doubtful from the record that the preparation of a regional plan was seen as a great opportunity; such an attitude existed during the preparation of the BARTC plan, but probably not in the early 1960's.

But the more illustrative information about the nature of ABAG's sense of regional planning was expressed in the RPC minutes:

A paramount consideration was the fact that a regional planning function is going to be performed by some level of government and that unless ABAG proceeds with its own planning activity the counties and cities of the Bay Area will lose control of the economic and social uses of land.⁹

The planning program was still an unwanted child; it was being contemplated only to keep ahead of other "outside" proposals. Far from viewing the region as a functioning metropolitan area, the ABAG RPC response was motivated only by conflict over territoriality. The substantial reasons for regional planning based on the need to nurture a functional metropolis as so clearly expressed in the 1954 and 1956 PDC reports and the BARTC study - were not the guiding forces in 1962. Even the professional planners were

silent on the issue, in strong contrast to earlier times.

While the TAG proposal itself is not terribly important - it was soon succeeded by a more comprehensive one - the evolution of ideas that stood behind it is. The traditions so firmly developed in the late forties and early fifties about the Bay region as a metropolis, an area that was more than just a statistical convenience, had in effect now been broken with. The emergent view in the sixties was instead dominated by a concern over the powers of local government in relation to the needs of the region. The visionary role that kept asking for new perspectives on current problems did not surface in ABAG in 1961-63; rather, the desire to plan was forced by the grudging recognition that if we don't, someone else will. The beginning point was always, what is the minimum that will resolve the current issue, not bind us to future action, and be politically expedient? This view is caricatured somewhat to emphasize a reality that ABAG, as a council of governments, has not and probably never will overcome. It is a reality that must pervade any view of the regional planning effort that was to follow, for despite the ambitions and aspirations of the planners themselves, it set the tone for policy decisions over which they had little influence.

Pressures to Establish Regional Planning

One of the strongest influences on ABAG for action on regional planning was the result of an increase in interest in Bay area transportation problems. Ever since the mid-forties, there had been a strong lobby for transportation planning and development in the Bay Area. Business and industry groups, particularly the Bay Area Council, had worked with others who felt a need for the coordinated planning of a metropolitan transportation system. The BARTC study and plan had been the earliest result of those efforts, and with the growing use of the automobile and the accompanying demand for more free-

ways, interest in expanded transportation facilities continued to be strong.

Two events combined to bring a surge of transportation planning activity to the fore in the Bay Area in the early sixties. In 1962, the Federal Highway Aid Act was passed, making comprehensive transportation planning a requirement for receipt of federal grants. Such planning had to be done on a cooperative, intergovernmental basis in areas of over 50,000 population - for the Bay Area, this meant on a region-wide bases.

Secondly, the Bay Area Rapid Transit District, which replaced the BARTC in 1957, had prepared plans for a three-county rail rapid transit system. In November, 1962, the bond issue for construction of the system was submitted to the voters in the three counties, and passed into law.

The realization that these events were going to soon occur, and the generally complex and critical transportation difficulties of the region in the early sixties led to the formation of the Bay Area Transportation Coordination Committee in January, 1962. Initiated by a powerful and rising state senator, Eugene McAteer, the Committee was an assemblage of representatives from almost all interests concerned with transportation in the region, including the Bay Area Council - and ABAG.

After preliminary meetings, the Committee drafted a prospectus for a four-million dollar regional transportation study, relying on the federal government to finance the planning it required for highway grant approvals. The proposed Bay Area Transportation Study Commission (BATSC) was, as with the BARTC, to be a state-created body with an appointed policy board.

With a budget of four million dollars and being responsible for a comprehensive transportation plan - including land use - BATSC was viewed as having the potential to perform the kind of "sophisticated" planning that many professionals and business interests saw as necessary for the region.

Compared with the concurrent McInnis/TAG proposals being generated in ABAG, BATSC was a much different creature - and consequently a threat to ABAG almost as great as the GGA in 1960 had been.

The strong backing behind the Committee proposals seemed to assure that the BATSC proposal would pass the state legislature. This led the local governments, through ABAG, to demand that the Association be given both the policy lead in developing the transportation plan, and the "custody and maintenance" responsibility for the planning data when the plan was completed. Thus BATSC became, in fact, the catalyzing factor in an October, 1962 decision by ABAG to "assume the regional planning function."

But in addition to BATSC, three other factors were adding to the pressure on local governments to establish regional planning:

First, there were the continuing attempts by various interests for a regional planning district: despite the failure of AB 2560 in 1961, there was still an undercurrent of opinion for placing the regional planning function in a district, rather than a COG.

Second, the trend of the Federal government was to more and more require regional planning as a prerequisite to grant approvals; bonus provisions for open space grants were a strong incentive for regional planning.

Third, there was the shaky identity of ABAG itself; with San Francisco, Oakland, and several other cities and counties still not members, the Association desperately needed legitimacy if it was to continue as a protective forum for local governments of the whole region.

The park and open space report, cited earlier, had been the first attempt at filling this need. Urged in 1961 by the newly-formed Citizens for Regional Recreation and Parks (CRRP) to prepare a comprehensive regional plan, the Association - primarily due to John McInnis' opposition¹⁰ - had backed away from such action. Instead it acceded to CRRP requests for a park inventory, work which CRRP had begun a year earlier.

The Third Attempt

It was against this background that the October, 1962 meeting of the Association's General Assembly was held, with the main item of business the

consideration of the RPC's Proposed Regional Planning Program, as developed by the committee TAG.

The much-touted decision of this meeting to have ABAG "assume the responsibility and leadership for the regional planning function" was not a variation from the past history of the Association. It was the result of the cumulation of pressures, not the voluntary recognition of need, and as such it was merely the most visible "change" point in an ongoing sequence of events.

The language of an additional part of the general assembly resolution itself is particularly instructive:

- 1) ABAG should retain the function of review and policy control over regional land use questions and over alternative concepts for development of the region in order to prevent the transportation study group from becoming an ad hoc planning agency. (emphasis added)
- 2) ABAG should assume responsibility for continuation of regional transportation planning when the study project is completed.¹¹

As proposed by the RPC/TAG report, regional planning would encompass the preparation of an advisory, non-adopted plan and policies, collection and dissemination of data, promotion of coordination and cooperation between government levels, and the development of special studies. The financing of this operation would be through the federal 701 planning assistants grant program, thereby completing an almost full circle from the 1961 McInnis report.

Additionally, the RPC report had a recommendation on plan implementation:

ABAG provides an unmatched potential for achieving implementation of plans. The county and city governments of the Bay Area - the constituent members of ABAG - have both the authority to plan and the authority to execute plans through zoning and ordinances and other land use regulations. In addition, this proposal makes regional planning a responsibility of the elected legislative officials of the Bay Area.¹²

Also approved at this meeting was an agreement that Association review of local open space plans was to guide grant review decisions, pursuant to federal requirements; this was the first step in creating the administrative role that under later federal guidelines would remain the Association's sole "power." The suggestion of the RPC report that there were other "potentials" would remain just that - a suggestion of potential that could not be made into a reality.

The stages that ABAG and its Regional Planning Committee had gone through to reach this level of development had each been characterized by an inadequate response to an outside pressure; the first view of regional planning was that it would be done by a volunteer coordinator, who would simply assemble local plans; the second stage was that a small, paid staff would conduct this compositing effort; finally, in the October resolution the Association committed itself to an ill-defined program that for the first time carried the notion that maybe regional planning was more than just the sum of all local plans. However, it would be the new staff more than the local government members who would transform this statement into a substantial planning program in the next years.

But even with the decision to "assume the planning function," there was a decided avoidance of what the task of metropolitan regional planning might really entail. Most members of the Association still thought small about such planning, seeing it more in the vein of "tinkering" - much as boards and councils had viewed county and city planning in the thirties and forties. One doubts whether the ABAG members saw the essence of city planning that Kent described so well:

When the city and county legislators of the Bay Area want a regional plan, they will also recognize, I believe, that such a plan must be prepared by a government. No non-governmental association or voluntary group effort, however well intentioned, can

prepare and maintain a useful plan. A useful plan is one that will be accepted by the courts as a legitimate public expression of the long-range aspirations and policies of the community, and that can, therefore, be used to explain and justify the need for public actions affecting private property, and for raising and spending public funds for capital improvements. No city council or county board of supervisors, would expect to receive a reasonable long-range general development plan that would be useful to them. . . as a result of voluntary efforts of the neighborhood improvement associations, chambers of commerce, and other special interest and local interest groups within their territories. City and county legislators understand this. They will, I believe, recognize that the situation is comparable at the level of the metropolitan Bay Area."¹³

Since the Association still had almost no staffing - what little there was existed to assist the executive director in communicating with member jurisdictions and performing administrative tasks - the responsibility for preparing the necessary urban planning assistance grant application fell again to the Technical Advisory Group of the RPC.

Work on the document was completed in the early summer of 1963; it had to then be presented to each of the member boards of supervisors for their approval. John McInnis, now serving a term as president of ABAG, and Warren Schmid, the executive director, undertook this task and received the required commitments of financial and service support from each of the eight member counties (Solano County was not, and never became, a member), and through them, the cities. With these approvals in hand, the 701 grant application was filed with the Housing and Home Finance Agency (later to become the Department of Housing and Urban Development) in September of 1963.

The program outlined in the application had several key features. The first of these was the budget that had been proposed; a total of \$256,000 had been proposed for the two-year effort - local contributions (cities and counties) amounted to \$70,000; the State, through the Public Health Department, supplied \$15,000; and the remaining \$171,000 comprised the grant request. Two-thirds of the local contributions were in-kind rather than cash; whether this represented a desire of local governments to play an influential role in the program, or simply an unwillingness to spend anything above an absolute minimum on regional planning is unclear.

The staff that the budget provided for consisted of the following positions:

Planning Director	\$15,000
Sr. Research Planner	\$10,000
Sr. Advance Planner	\$10,000
Secretary	\$ 5,000

In the second year, the following positions would be added:

Assoc. Research Planner	\$ 8,500
Assoc. Advance Planner	\$ 8,500
Planning Technician	\$ 6,000
Clerk	\$ 4,200

The significance of the budget proposal was both in the number of positions it created for the regional planning task, and the levels at which it paid them.

The Bay Area is approximately 7,000 square miles in size, and in 1963, contained almost four million people. At the regional level, there was little background information on which to base the preparation of a regional plan; the times had changed so quickly that much of the BARTC data was now of little use, and the Corps of Engineers study had only used projections based on generalized standards - no detailed regional data had been gathered.

A planning staff of essentially four professional planners had been designated in the application to carry out a program whose scope, in the words of the application, would:

- a. Consider all forces, public and private, shaping the physical development of the San Francisco Bay region.
- b. Cover land uses and controls as well as plans for physical development and combine all elements of urban development and renewal into a comprehensive general plan.
- c. Cover the entire San Francisco Bay region -- the area included within the Counties of Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, Solano, Sonoma, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and the City and County of San Francisco.
- d. Involve in the planning process the political jurisdictions and agencies which make decisions affecting development of the metropolitan area.

e. Link the process of planning to action programs.¹

The HHFA application also had other requirements that it would ask of the new planning program; the maintenance of a data bank for both ABAG and BATSC material; the preparation of three special studies; and the on-going administration of the review of local requests for federal grant funding.

The motivations behind the low funding level are unclear. To many, if not most, the sum of \$256,000 seemed a very adequate amount to spend on developing a regional plan. But did that attitude represent a sincere belief that a program budget of only \$125,000 per year would be adequate for planning on a regional scale, or was it indicative of the lack of understanding of mayors, councilpersons, and supervisors of the requirements of planning programs in general?

If the form of the ABAG planning program was in large part designed to rest on the experience of local legislators with city planning, it was not necessarily true that those involved in both the Association at large or the RPC understood or had a positive view of city planning. That few, if any, of them had a positive view of regional planning is most probable, since the purpose of ABAG was to represent local governments in matters of regional concern.

The second issue raised by the budget was the level of the salaries offered. While any attempt to link quality with amount of compensation is fraught with tremendous difficulties, at least the following observations can be made:

When the TAG recommendations of December, 1961 had been accepted by the RPC, the language used to describe the staff was "small and well-qualified". The 701 application termed the staff "small and highly qualified".


The ambivalence between these terminologies and the realities of the jobs, as expressed in the budget, was substantial.

More than being just a matter of several thousand dollars, it touched on a deeper issue: ABAG was not approaching regional planning - even in its limited concept of it - by saying, "we should have the best planning program possible." Instead, the planning function was to be an experiment, expandable only when the need was proven.

Coupled with its two-year nature, this attitude implied a status for the program that was - intentionally or unintentionally - designed to work counter to the positive view of the staff expressed in the application. This became even more evident during the process of selecting a director for the program. When the ABAG representative described the position in highly favorable language to the man who would eventually be selected, the response given was, "If it's such a great job, why didn't someone from the Bay Area take it?"

The answer to the question was not an obvious one. The salary was certainly low, but there was also a lack of planners in the region with direct experience in large scale metropolitan planning. While some of the counties - Santa Clara in particular - certainly matched the urban patterns of the more consciously styled metropolitan areas of the midwest and the east, they were still counties, not regions. The identity was hard to escape.

More probably, the difficulty was in what almost all planners in the San Francisco region knew from experience: ABAG was almost certainly not going to be interested in strong planning; the program was, despite the federally-required commitment, a two-year experiment; and besides, the salaries were low, particularly compared to BATSC, which had a four million dollar budget.



ABAG REGIONAL PLANNING PROGRAM

POLICY STRUCTURE

1964

The Proposed Planning Program

The substance of the program consisted of five components: a policy/decision-making structure; the preliminary plan itself; three special studies; an intergovernmental coordination function; and a contract agreement with BATSC.

The policy function was primarily headed by the RPC (a diagrammatic interpretation is provided on the facing page). The authority relationships were fairly vague at the outset; the planning director in fact responded mainly to the RPC, while the ABAG executive director played only an administrative role. The Executive Committee, while making some policy decisions, for all intents and purposes played a minor role in the development of the plan - the RPC remained, under John McInnis, the central policy forum. A further consideration was that the Association staff, as a whole, was extremely small - besides the planners, there were less than half dozen others, mostly clerical.

The preliminary plan as a concept was left very undefined in the project application; what emphasis there was had been placed on the expected role of the plan:

b. Regional Plan: Prepare, adopt and maintain a regional plan for the physical development of the Bay Area utilizing the general plans or developmental policies of the county and city governments of the area and based upon studies of region-wide needs. The regional plan would provide a guide for the general physical planning, the long-range fiscal planning, and the capital improvement programming of local governments, state and federal agencies and special districts. It would be advisory only and would be recommended to counties and cities for their acceptance.²

The special studies that were required were each a result of an issue that was then confronting ABAG. The first study, a regional parks and open space element, was an outgrowth of the open space inventory of 1962, and the new federal grant provisions dealing with bonus provisions for open

space acquisition in regions with areawide planning programs.

The second study was a plan for shoreline development. Although this is explored in more detail later, it was proposed as a defensive response to the pending Bay Study Commission (later to become the Bay Conservation and Development Commission).

The third element called for was a solid waste disposal study. Stemming from the early days of ABAG, it was a joint effort with the State Department of Public Health to project the future need for refuse dumping sites.

The intergovernmental coordination function, closely tied to issues involved in implementing the proposed regional plan, was left as vague as the description of the plan itself. Partly because of the sensitivity of local government, and partly because the federal government had not yet made regional review of most local grant proposals a required function of regional agencies, the coordination role was described as:

d. Regional Cooperation and Coordination: Promote and encourage understanding of the need for regional cooperation; join with city, county, regional, state and federal agencies, and with private groups, in the development of coordinated procedures for dealing with regional development problems that are of concern to all; and create a greater degree of uniformity and standardization in the terminology and methodology of regulatory measures (e.g., zoning and subdivision ordinances). Achieve guidance and coordination of physical development through joint action of all governmental agencies.³ (emphasis added)

The final activity area of the proposed program was the coordination of ABAG's planning work with that of BATSC. Later to become problematic, the interlocking of the two programs had first been made in the Bay Area Transportation Coordination Committee meetings in 1962.

In general, ABAG was to prepare the land use plan and policy framework within which BATSC would develop a regional transportation plan. BATSC would also supply detailed data and model evaluations, while ABAG would maintain that data for other users. The implications of this arrangement are

discussed later.

With the program as thus outlined, the application passed through the HHFA, and in February, 1964, ABAG began its search for a planning director.

Part Three: THE PRELIMINARY REGIONAL PLAN

Initial Organization

The effort to find a director for the regional planning program in early 1964 was only one side of what was then occurring within the Association. While planning was the only program activity which ABAG was actually undertaking, a great deal of attention was being given to two other events.

With the publication of the 1960 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers report the realization of just how much impact land filling could have on the San Francisco Bay began to grow. Starting with a small group of Berkeley conservationists, a citizen movement to halt the continued filling developed. It was the intention of the citizen group to secure legislation at the state level that would protect the vulnerable Bay ecology.¹

Having attracted State Senator McAteer's attention in 1963, the Save-the-Bay movement succeeded in getting its legislation passed - first for a six-month study (May to October, 1964), then in early 1965 for the establishment of a three-year commission charged with preparing a plan and implementation recommendations. In addition the Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC), as the agency was called, operated under the umbrella of a temporary moratorium on filling, and had control of a permit system for exceptions. All in all, BCDC had the makings of becoming a powerful regional organization.

The Association's own response to the problems of the Bay was in keeping with its prior pattern. Recognizing that some form of action on limiting the amount of fill was now necessary, ABAG members proposed in 1964 to establish their own regulatory system based on joint exercise of

powers agreements between all of the affected local governments; a new and separate regional agency with planning and implementation powers was viewed as unnecessary and highly undesirable by the Association members.

However, the attempt to prevent BCDC from becoming an established single-purpose agency was unsuccessful because what ABAG members had proposed could not be agreed on quickly enough; the negotiations between local governments for a joint powers agreement were fraught with time consuming controversy, and the Save-the-Bay organization was not going to wait for local governments to resolve their disagreements through bargaining - Save-the-Bay wanted a BCDC now. They also doubted that the ABAG proposal would bring the results they saw as necessary to preserve the Bay's resources.

The effects of the Association's positions and actions on its planning program were threefold. First, since ABAG had gone on record as opposing BCDC, a certain amount of tension was created between the two agencies - a tension made all the more real by BCDC's eventual success in preparing and implementing a strong plan.

Behind this relationship was the implication that since local governments couldn't solve Bay-related problems on their own - even when they made a deliberate effort - it was necessary for BCDC to "rescue" the Bay from those local governments. This in turn opened the question of how ABAG's planning program would view the Bay - would its proposals attempt to be consistent with the BCDC planning, would it prepare a pro-development scheme (ABAG's Preliminary Plan was scheduled to be completed a year and a half before BCDC's), or would it abdicate on shoreline planning altogether? These issues occupied much time in the first months of the planning program and they left large question marks over the direction which the program might take.

Thirdly, the BCDC issue threw a decidedly negative light on the statement in the HHFA 701 grant application that so positively touted the "potential" of ABAG implementing its plans through cooperative action of local governments. If the Association's members could not agree on a limited set of agreements, how would a regional plan which was meant to be more than just an assemblage of local plans fare when it came to effectuation? It would be hard to ignore this question when it came to preparing the plan itself.

The second event which was directly affecting the new planning program was the Bay Area Transportation Study. The ABAG planning program had been set out prior to the final development of the BATS work program, but coordination of the two efforts was necessary. The result was that the ABAG program would have to undergo revision to accommodate the BATS program, which had been developed separately. The administrative problem and the larger planning issues which BATS posed for the ABAG program are discussed in a following section.

It was into this situation that the newly selected planning director, James Hickey, came. A graduate of Michigan State's urban planning curriculum, Hickey's experience had been in medium-sized metropolitan planning agencies in Ohio. His academic background had been based in the more traditional field of physical design, combining landscape architecture and urban planning. In addition, from 1961-63 he had served on a study committee of the American Institute of Planners attempting to develop conceptual definitions of metropolitan planning.

In July of 1964 Hickey moved into the offices which ABAG occupied in the Hotel Claremont in Berkeley. For the next five months the planning staff consisted of one person, one desk and an office - and the planning area was 7000 square miles, with a population of almost four million people.

The impact of this on Hickey himself must have been substantial: the history of the region, the immediate difficulties of the Association, and the questionable status of the ABAG planning program all posed a tremendous inertia to be overcome. But at the same time, these same pressures offered a great opportunity. In a sense Hickey was cut off from much of the work around him - there was no organization to keep him informed, no set of contacts waiting for his use, and no prior work to be administered or to use as a guideline - it would all have to start with him. The result must have been a very pronounced sense of responsibility for the region, experienced through confronting the task of preparing a plan for its future. In contemplating that plan, there was little that wasn't first of all conceptual and basic, that didn't initially need to be dealt with in a broad, almost intuitive manner.

The inertia that most established planning efforts develop tends to make difficult such basic questions. However at ABAG in 1964 there was the opportunity for setting the first direction; only once would that sense of open future offer itself - after the planning program had developed all of the trappings of an established operation, it would be more difficult to formulate the clear views of the region that were possible now.

To be sure, the physical development of the Bay region had left much predetermined, and local plan proposals and policies were not to be ignored by any means. But if planning was to be a means for shaping a desired regional future, and not just an inevitable one, then such limits existed only insofar as there was an unwillingness to alter them.

In Hickey's view the region itself was a metropolitan core around the hub of the Bay; geography seemed the most clearly defined controlling element of a plan. While at one point contemplating a smaller metropolitan core than the "ring" surrounding the Bay, the boundaries of the plan were

taken as the nine-county area, mainly due to ABAG's organizational composition.

As opposed to a more "functionally" oriented approach - relying on economic or transportation networks, for example - Hickey's view of the metropolitan region was based strongly on the physical forms of future development. Whatever happened in the economic sector, or to the transportation opportunities of the region's population would inevitably occur within the context of some combination of land uses - it was the responsibility of regional planning to suggest the type of future that different forms might bring with them.

But the great bulk of the conceptual thinking was to be postponed for the moment - the task of hiring a staff and developing a detailed work program, while simultaneously carrying out the administration of the fledgling federal grant review program, was more pressing.

The first two staff planners hired, Robert Cornish and Peter Peel, were to do much of the actual plan preparation work; a third, and later a fourth person were hired to develop the research capability that would supply much of the background information. Cornish, hired as the senior regional planner, had graduated from the University of California planning program at Berkeley. As a masters thesis topic, he had written on the open space provisions and general planning procedures of the 1956 BARTC plan. Peel-who also came from the UC program - and Cornish had never worked for a regional agency, but both had experience with urban planning through work with city planning consultants.

Starting to Plan

The development of a work program was a complex task. The uncertainty surrounding ABAG made it necessary to weigh certain strategic considerations

carefully, and to integrate the type and amount of work that was to go into plan preparation with those considerations.

The first such consideration was time; the plan had to be produced in approximately twenty months. Since the small size of the ABAG staff precluded direct data gathering, a careful assessment of how to get existing local and regional agencies to supply information in the required time had to be made, for it would take time just to establish the necessary communication links. The short time for the plan effort also served to emphasize the preliminary nature of the plan; at the outset, Hickey saw the larger time framework of the planning program as consisting of two phases - two years for the preliminary plan and then two years for the preparation of the regional plan (by 1968). The two-year segments were dictated by federal grant requirements.

The second strategic consideration was an overriding need to create credibility for the ABAG planning program; however the plan was to be prepared, and whatever it was eventually to propose had to meet this need. Although the preliminary format was largely dictated by the federal requirements on the terms of the 701 grant, it was equally called for by the uncertainty of the member local governments about the possible results. The future plan had to reassure those local governments in such a manner that they would later support and adopt a regional plan based on the experience with the preliminary plan.

The preliminary plan format was further reinforced by the staff's realization that it could not, in twenty months, produce a fully-evaluated set of alternatives and a detailed recommended plan. The choice therefore was made to attempt to exploit the preliminary, discussion-oriented nature of the effort - to prepare the document not as a product with a fixed set of ideas, but rather as a conceptual and relatively uncomplicated

offering of choices. The acceptance of the planning program would then rest on a preliminary plan prepared mainly as a tool for focusing debate, rather than as a more fixed representation of the regional plan.

A third major strategy at the outset revolved around the question of how to make the plan - and the planning program - effective in implementation. The credibility/acceptability problem was intertwined with this, since implementation would clearly hinge on how strongly the Association's members would support the plan's proposals. But in addition, the plan had to be useful to the one implementation "tool" that was available - the review of local government grant requests to the federal government. While grant review in 1964 was not yet a strongly developed function, nonetheless it was understood that it would probably increase in importance and scope in the near future.

Since there was little direct effectuation authority for the plan to be linked to, the staff had to focus on different roles for the plan, mainly seeing it as a means for establishing an atmosphere and basis for later and hopefully stronger plan and implementation efforts. Consistent with the preliminary nature of the plan (and the program as a whole), effectiveness was understood as enhanced credibility and open, clear communication between regional and local governmental levels. Thoughts of a strong emphasis on implementation were put off in favor of developing communication.

Hickey's work program itself was based on three major objectives: first, goals, policy guidelines and physical plans needed to be developed for the region; second, methods for gaining the participation of local legislators and planners needed to be established; and third, the Association's planning program had to provide research and information capabilities on matters of regional concern.²

To meet these objectives, the actual work tasks encompassed the following areas:

- 1) Basic information development, including base maps, air photographs and design of an electronic data processing system.
- 2) Regional goal development, based on local land use regulations and plans, formulation and analysis of issues and communication with local governments.
- 3) Planning studies, covering population, economic base projections, land use surveys and growth trends.
- 4) Plan preparation, of both the regional plan and the special elements, and the evaluation and selection of alternatives.
- 5) Effectuation, including proposals for new programs and future planning efforts, and public information dissemination.³

The more specific methodologies utilized in carrying out these tasks are discussed in a following section.

BATS

The work program outlined by the Association planning staff was designed to be carried out in close coordination with the Bay Area Transportation Study, which began in late 1964. The funding of BATS and the beginning of its efforts to prepare a regional transportation plan caused a substantial amount of shifting in the ABAG program. In a December, 1964 agreement the two agencies attempted to divide responsibilities and arrange for coordination. But despite this the BATS program still became entangled in problems of internal management. Those problems in turn took their toll on the ABAG staff throughout the preliminary plan preparation period, due to the large amounts of time it took to keep the two programs coordinated.

What BATS did offer to ABAG was the opportunity to have access to detailed data and to computer analysis - BATS' potential information capability was a means of further bolstering the modestly-funded regional planning program, and thereby increasing its acceptability. In turn, ABAG

retained the responsibility for preparing policy and general plan frameworks for the transportation study.

More than being just a poorly-run program - it would go out of business in 1969 without having produced the transportation plan it was responsible for - BATS was symbolic of a larger problem. The transportation study was conceived of as a high-powered, "sophisticated" program; it would use the newly emerging computer technologies to their fullest and provide for detailed analysis of land use and transportation interactions. But even more significant was the fact that BATS was representative of a dominant type of metropolitan planning going on in the major metropolitan regions of the U.S. in the early 1960's.

. . . It was held that the type and density of activity at a given location were strongly influenced by the relative level of transportation facilities and services available. Therefore, if the prevalent low density, uncoordinated subdivision type development was believed undesirable, then the highway-oriented transportation systems should be revised so as not to promote such development. Such arguments led to the expectation that transportation systems were the lever for obtaining a more desirable physical pattern of metropolitan development.⁴

By its nature, transportation planning lent itself fairly easily to quantitative analysis of alternatives. Coupled with computer development, the growing interest of engineers and increasing availability of planners with transportation planning skills, such quantitative analysis appeared as a highly attractive means of plan development. But the large amounts of data that such methods required led to a sequence of problems:

These programs expected that mathematical models for forecasting urban growth and for simulating travel characteristics could be rapidly developed, would be reliable and effective, and would save large amounts of staff time. In almost all cases, immense amounts of data were collected in anticipation of the construction and employment of such models for the elaboration of alternatives.

As the programs unfolded, the magnitude of the latter ambitions gradually became apparent. Considerable difficulties and delays were experienced in operationalizing the theoretical models,

and these were compounded by appreciable data management problems. Consequently, the number of alternatives prepared and the differences among them were severely limited, and work schedules were drastically revised, often resulting in a loss of credibility for the planning effort. Alternately, agencies resorted to crude short cuts, interim plans, or dropped the use of mathematical models altogether to stay somewhat close to schedule.

The dilemma posed by this situation was particularly perplexing. While the use of computer methods was demanding of time and staff resources, important advances in metropolitan planning capability could not be achieved without utilizing computer techniques. Because of the above problems, the evaluation phase of these programs typically was hurried and too narrow in its scope. In addition, evaluation was less meaningful than it might have been because of the narrow range of differences among the alternatives being evaluated.

The experience of the past few years (1965-1970) also indicates that the growing understanding of metropolitan processes on the part of professional planners outstripped their ability to communicate this understanding effectively to public officials or to the general public. This situation had clear implications for evaluation methods and public participation. The decision process often appeared to be a matter of sophisticated analysis versus blunt political or subjective reaction. In retrospect, the primary emphasis in these programs over the past few years has been the development and testing of planning methods, leaving unsufficient time for a complementary emphasis on their application in fostering, examining and supporting creative ideas about the form of the future metropolis.⁵

It was precisely this "paralysis by analysis" dilemma that the ABAG planners successfully avoided; BATS might have become a millstone but the ABAG staff did not let it slow down the impetus of their program. In a sense, the low funding of the Association's program kept them from becoming enmeshed in a world of print-out and intricate analysis - the clarity of regional planning goals were retained and the resultant plan images were understandable, even if one disagreed with them.

One can only speculate on the role of the individual planner in precipitating or avoiding such difficulties. Hickey's own view of plans in general was: "The key is attention. It is better to have a plan that has problems and gets attention than a good plan that gets thrown in the corner."⁶ While it is best to have both a good plan and attention, the

most important thing was to produce a useable product - one that could focus discussion and decision making on the basic choices a community might have to make about its future.

The Planning Directors Committee

Hickey recognized early in the program the importance of establishing linkages with the planning directors of the region's cities and counties. He saw the directors as a means of meeting two highly pressing problems. First, there was the simple lack of information; five staff persons and 7000 square miles of planning area was a problematic combination, even with BATS' resources. What was needed, particularly for the first months when land use surveys were being prepared, was a way of communicating with local planning staffs, who had much of the desired information already available.

The second problem was that of gaining the respect and understanding of the local planning departments for the regional program; if the plan's proposals were clearly understood and supported by local staffs, much progress could be made toward implementing whatever was to finally be proposed. The understanding that Hickey was attempting to develop was more than just an awareness of information or of pending events - it was an effort to further implant a sense of regional consciousness that would find its way into more than just a few local actions. It was the effort to give local planners a sense of regional responsibility, and to hopefully have them in turn educate their policy boards to that type of understanding.

An example of this relationship had been provided early by the work of the San Francisco Department of City Planning in the late forties. In all of the major planning documents, a great emphasis was placed on first spelling out the role of the proposal at hand to the regional position of San Francisco. This has become a tradition in the city over

time, and continues even today.⁷

In addition, the technical expertise represented by the local planning directors would be a means of increasing the Association's planning strength. Partly in a cooptive sense, but also partly out of need, the ABAG staff wanted the participation of other professionals.

If Hickey was strongly motivated to revitalize the languishing PDC, it was not clear that all of the local directors were equally desirous of contact. While several had been and would continue to be active supporters of and participators in the regional planning program, there was uncertainty in some quarters about Hickey, and about the possibility of the Association achieving worthwhile results in general. Coupled with the lack of direction and activity since 1956 (the BARTC plan and the PDC documents), the network of planning directors was not a ready-made vehicle for assistance in the regional planning effort - the PDC would have to be restarted.

Hickey set up the first meetings in May, 1965, the city and county directors each gathering separately. Speaking to each, he described the ABAG program and proposed that the PDC act as direct advisor to both BATS and the Association; rather than being a more general body like the Technical Advisory Group had been, or a policy body like the RPC or the Executive Committee, the Planning Directors Committee would be re-established as an advisor to the director of each of the two regional programs - they would be a "cabinet" of experts.

The PDC role in the effort to prepare the preliminary plan was probably stronger than that of any other group, including the RPC as a whole, or the Executive Committee. Although relatively the director's role was not a dominant factor in policy choices - the staff itself and a few key individuals were more important - they were probably an easier group

for the ABAG staff to communicate with on technical matters, and they did represent possibly the most important group when it came to implementing the plan.

However, the PDC never opted to take action on matters of substance in the more organized fashion that had been characteristic in the Telesis group and the 1954 and 1956 PDC reports; their role in the sixties was characterized by a lack of any commonly agreed upon program explaining the values they as professional planners sought to advance. The Committee remained primarily as professional advisor and occasional critic to the ABAG staff. The position of many of the directors was generally standoffish; in reference to a regional goals questionnaire distributed by the ABAG staff, the minutes of a PDC meeting summed up the attitude of many of the directors thus: "This isn't something the planning directors should be involved with - bring us your plan when you have finished it and we will react."⁸

Producing the Plan

The technical procedures used in preparing the preliminary plan are not a major issue in this paper. Nevertheless, a brief summary of what considerations were put into the recommendations of the PRP can be useful in providing some depth to a description of the proposals themselves.

To begin with, the entire ABAG preliminary planning program was "handcrafted": there was not enough time and money to do the "sophisticated" planning that an agency like BATS was supposedly capable of. Hence the techniques that were used were of a pencil-and-paper nature - heavy use of hand-drafted maps, and of non-quantitative evaluation of local policy implications.

It would, however, be a mistake to equate the basic level of planning methodology used with the quality of the results achieved. Therefore,

instead of being blocked by having to "handcraft" their plan, the ABAG staff simply went out and did what they judged had to be done to prepare the preliminary plan. Although the working tools they used - often rough colored pencil lines on flimsy tracing paper or guess-estimates of quantities - were by many of today's criteria almost crude, they were geared toward making the types of choices that then needed to be made - choices among conceptual alternatives, rather than detailed, "factual" ones. The first problem was to create a consciousness of region and a sense of deliberately choosing a future. The details of that future would come in time, as would appropriate methods for dealing with them; but the PRP emphasis was on basic choice and commitment.

Much of the basis for the recommended preliminary plan came from the studies of local policies - both zoning and general plans. In the zoning and general plan comparison, the data pertaining to each was gathered, translated into a standard classification scheme and then plotted on a map. The procedure meant that the staff had to make decisions about ambiguous zoning and general plan categories in order to make them equivalent at the regional scale. In some cases, this led to strong disagreement from local officials or planners.

But this procedure was itself a symbol: Regional planning became a means of clarifying intentions and impacts; the pertinent question was, "Is this what you really want?" In a sense it was pointing toward one role for regional planning, a role that would perforce general tensions, but at the same time be a way of bringing local actions under the scrutiny of a regional perspective. However, it would be of the dynamics of a voluntary council of local governments that would then have to grapple with any resultant inconsistencies - and it remains doubtful whether such a council of governments can ever be expected to make such hard

choices and act on them.

Of the other procedures used in arriving at the preliminary plan, probably the most influential were the land surveys done in relation to the open space element. These were conducted under the program title of Land Resource Evaluation (LRE); physical characteristics of the landscape were mapped, and where appropriate, standards were applied to constrain or shape urbanization. Thus, slopes of over thirty per cent were generally classified as undevelopable.

From the LRE, development standards were formulated relative to location and intensity of use. Most of these were also rule-of-thumb oriented (e.g., "Industrial centers - avoid slopes of 5% and over").

The actual translation of these to the concept and plan diagrams was a judgemental process, tempered by the months of working with local policies and studies of historical regional development patterns. There was no elaborate methodology or rule system used in preparing the map proposals, simply an awareness of physical, economic and political constraints as seen in the light of goals that the staff had developed.

Many of the background studies on which the plan was based had either come from, or had been extensively discussed with local planning staffs. Thus, although the ABAG research planner prepared - through BATS - a cohort-survival population projection, all local agencies were surveyed for their projections and the ABAG results were then evaluated against them. It was this give and take that made "handcrafting" a viable means, especially since there were only four planners actually doing the planning work.

In developing the PRP, the ABAG staff in effect had to choose between expending large amounts of time developing bases for more elaborate and new methodologies (as BATSC was trying to do), or moving ahead with producing a plan that was a concept-oriented discussion tool. In choosing

the latter approach the staff at least implicitly recognized that the first step for planning the metropolitan region needed to be a simple one - an over-abundance of investigative work posed the danger of never being able to state the basic choices a region would need to make about its future.

The Plan

On November 4th, 1966 the General Assembly of the Association met to hear its staff present the Preliminary Regional Plan. The day was spent listening to Hickey and his planners discuss the entire report; at the end of the presentation, the Assembly voted to accept the document and to begin the year-long review process; as had been previously decided, there was to be no adoption of a plan at this point.

The ABAG staff had prepared the Preliminary Plan as a set of questions, shaped by certain development alternatives and a recommended preliminary plan. In the PRP's introduction, this approach was clearly expressed:

Therefore the purpose of this report is to sharpen the image of choices to be made at the regional level through the development of specific recommendations in the following areas of question:

- 1) What is the size of the growth to be accommodated within the region between 1965 and 1990?
- 2) What current and future planning problems of regional importance must be faced?
- 3) What basic assumptions need to be made to establish regional planning guidelines for the next 25 years?
- 4) What are the regional planning goals and policies for the Bay Region?
- 5) What is the most desirable form for the region, reflecting needs and desires as expressed in terms of goals and policies?
- 6) What next steps are needed to develop a recommended statement of regional goals and plan for the Bay Region?⁹ (emphasis added)

The role of the PRP can then be seen as almost being a workbook for guiding and shaping debate; it was a beginning point around which policy

level discussion could occur.

The plan document itself was straightforward in its planning approach: certain information about the region existed, including a history of growth and development; from this there was now a set of problems that needed to be met. In order to act on those problems, certain assumptions had to be made about things out of the control of government action. Based on those assumptions, regional goals and policies were established. In order to meet those goals and policies alternative physical plan concepts were developed and evaluated; a synthesis based on the evaluations and a comparison with local planning and development policies was made, resulting in a recommended plan concept.

From this planning approach, the plan contained twelve major points of substance: (see appendix for Recommended Plan and Open Space Element diagrams)

- 1) The primary understanding about growth and development in the region was that "in the future, the Bay Region's growth will be less and less a matter of historical chance and more and more a matter of metropolitan expansion."¹⁰ Rather than having the large in-migrations of the fifties, growth would tend to now be internally generated.
- 2) Pressures from such growth were identified as the major problem of the region. The impact of that growth was specified as being of special interest to regional planning in four areas: housing, open space, employment and transportation.
- 3) Assumptions about events or trends out of the control of local and regional decision makers were made, all of them indicating a positive view of the future. Among the most important were those dealing with the population question; an increase to 7.2 million people by 1990 was accepted without comment, despite the statement in the plan introduction cited above that "size of growth" was to be a matter for choice.

Additionally, environmental problems for such a population were also assumed to be satisfactorily resolvable, and the picture painted of the forthcoming decades gave no hint of the social and political turmoil that was to occur in the late sixties and early seventies.

- 4) Although the goals and policies themselves tended to be unex-

ceptional, one in particular was not:

A permanent open space system of sufficient size and locational qualities must be provided to meet the complete range of the region's recreational activities; to serve as a reserve for the protection and conservation of water and other natural resources; to maintain special agricultural areas; to prevent building in undesirable locations; to enhance the visual environment of the region; and to serve as a design feature for the achievement and maintenance of a desired regional form¹¹ (emphasis added)

- 5) In order to set the stage for alternative form concepts, three sections were presented showing: the existing regional land use pattern; and the currently permitted (by local zoning) pattern; and the currently desired pattern of uses, based on local plans. The composite plan based on local plans (as originally recommended by the RPC in 1961) was specifically rejected as the approach for preparing a regional plan.
- 6) The alternative future from of development concepts presented were based on three patterns: expansion along transportation corridors; expansion around compact city centers; and dispersed expansion at low suburban densities (current trend).
- 7) The recommended preliminary regional plan was a mixture of the alternative concepts, mostly resembling the city centered approach, but with substantial modifications.
- 8) Open space was also treated as a separate plan element, in addition to being indicated on the plan alternatives. The permanent open space system was composed of lands in the following categories: forestry, mineral production, agriculture, recreation, water resource protection, habitat protection, and areas to guide development. Non-permanent open space for urban expansion after 1990 - if such need could be shown - was the second broad category, and comprised approximately two-thirds of the designated open space.
- 9) The Shoreline Element indicated a generally conservative approach to Bay resource protection; while there was a large amount of potential urban shown on the north Bay shorelines, there were only two fill projects proposed in the element, one of which was finally later approved by BCDC. In general, the element was similar to the indication of the 1969 BCDC policies plan.
- 10) A special element was also prepared for transportation. The plan proposals here were fairly crude, including recommendations for giant "superfreeways" and a highly developed standard freeway system. The element was in part a stop-gap measure - BATS had not been able to prepare anything of substance as input to the plan.
- 11) Refuse disposal was dealt with more as a report than a plan - no proposals were put forth, only information on capacities and trends.

12) Finally, a description of a proposed regional information system was made; this was to be another means of creating a "regional frame of reference" and was based heavily on the use of model produced simulations, as well as some indexing of survey data from local governments.

In general, the Preliminary Regional Plan is distinctive for two reasons; first, it was published in a highly usable format. The information in the plan and how it was sequences accorded well with the staff's goal of initiating and assisting discussion on the plan proposals. In addition, it was a polished product graphically; the uncertainty over the plan's (and the staff's) acceptability had led to much time being spent on the preparation of the document itself. Part of the reason for this was to become more competitive, as it were, with the older and more established planning programs in the region - particularly those in Santa Clara County and San Francisco.

But a more important aspect of the plan was its open space element. In all other areas of content, the PRP was not greatly different than other metropolitan regional plans of the time. It was perhaps more clear about the basic nature of the alternatives it offered (although it lacked a rigorous evaluation of them) and a thorough reading of its contents raised a variety of substantial policy issues, but it was probably the first regional plan proposal to call for a large (1.8 million acres), permanent system of open space close-in to urban areas.

The open space system of the PRP was prepared at a time when open space was becoming an important - if still rather vaguely defined - term in discussions about urban and metropolitan problems. The work of Whyte and Strong¹² in particular was a strong influence on physical planning thought; Whyte's writing on natural resource preservation and Strong's extensive work on specific open space preservation techniques formed an important planning response to the popular concern over the extension of

what Jean Gottman had characterized as "Megalopolis". It picked up the threads that had been loosened after the demise of the Olmstead/Burnham approach to metropolitan planning in the thirties.

But most of the thought about the work on open space planning in the early and mid-sixties was still representative of American planners' inability to place open space in a solid conceptual framework; efforts like those of the British in the establishment of the London greenbelt were not to be found in the U.S. - while Olmstead and Burnham had tried, there was not yet an American Ebenezer Howard, or even a widespread sharing of his humanist philosophy. Perhaps the closest attempt had been the 1961 policies and diagram of the Year 2000 Plan for Washington, D.C.

In California, open space became prominent in planning practice and thought primarily through the work of numerous strong conservation groups, mostly focused on recreational or natural resource issues. But perhaps more than any other single effort it was a report on open space prepared in 1965 as part of the State's Development Plan program that really fueled a wide-reaching attempt to see open space as somehow related to questions of metropolitan form and function - or at least as being more than an umbrella phrase for a multiplicity of land uses.

The report, The Urban Metropolitan Open Space Study prepared by Eckbo, Dean, Austin and Williams (EDAW), was a somewhat eclectic compendium of statistical information, caveats, quotes and general information. It was a format indicative of the current state of large scale open space planning at the time. But behind the apparent disorganization there were some powerful arguments, ones that have now become a familiar part of planning terminology, if not always evident in action. The overall tone of the report was based on the consideration that open space was not just a catch-all for vacant land, but rather was "of critical importance. . .

and must be considered an important integral part of the land uses of a given area."¹³ (emphasis added) Further, according to the report, there needed to be developed an attitude of stewardship for land, an attitude that would replace proprietary private, interests in land.

Based on an extensive survey of open space plans and inventories the report listed six major categories of open space, each in turn divided into subcategories. The major classifications were:

- 1) Lands for managed resource production.
- 2) Lands for preservation of human and natural resources
- 3) Lands for health, welfare and well-being
- 4) Lands for public safety
- 5) Lands for corridors
- 6) Lands for urban expansion¹⁴

The emphasis in this categorization was clearly on comprehensiveness; the myriad functions of open space needed to be stated and understood by planners, and internalized in conservation and development policy. The report stopped at categorization, however. Although there were further elaborations of the descriptions, the statements always stopped tantalizingly short of recognizing some more integral role for open space, as both an ecological and cultural resource. Although the ABAG PRP would attempt to build this system-like view, the bulk of such consciousness would only come in the late sixties, when awareness of the need to respond to environmental imperatives would reach a peak.

In addition, although the report was about metropolitan open space there was no rigor to the concept of metropolis or the role of open space systems in planning for such regions; what made open space at a metropolitan scale a different consideration than open space at a city level? How was a concept of open space to be formulated which would be a complement

to a vision of the form and structure of the metropolis? Instead of addressing these concerns, the EDAW report viewed metropolitan regions as mere statistical measures, and open spaces as land uses that would, like industrial sites, occur in some form or another, most likely unrelated to the livability goals of the region they were a part of. The EDAW report did not seem to meet its own challenge for relevance to the larger questions of metropolitan development.

But the report also had two strong contributions; first, it dwelt at length on the role of open space as a positive tool for shaping and guiding urban development. Normally viewed as such a tool only on the basis of hazard and associated risk (flooding, landslides, etc.) the EDAW report argued that open space must also be seen in another role:

By thus delimiting the areas to be used for urban expansion, identifiable communities of differing sizes, shapes, densities and character can be developed.¹⁵ (emphasis added)

Here was a reaffirmation of what British town and county planning had long recognized and acted on, and what had only in fits and starts been present in the U.S.: the idea that community physical size is a subject for public policy to determine, and that such policy could become the positive basis for an open space system or, as the English so often termed it, a greenbelt.

The other major contribution of the EDAW report was in its heavy emphasis on the concept of permanent open space - open space that would, particularly in areas close to urban areas, have to be set aside forever, for reasons including, but certainly not limited to, recreational use. The report was also candid in its observations about how much of this close-in, permanent open space would have to be preserved, and how - purchase of almost two million acres throughout the state, mostly near metropolitan regions, was recommended with full cognizance of the diffi-

culties involved. Zoning was proposed for large amounts of other valuable open space lands.

The EDAW report was published toward the middle of the ABAG planning program, and was the basis for much of the methodology used in the PRP. But it was the ABAG plan itself that was the first attempt to apply the (admittedly loose) EDAW thinking to a specific metropolitan region.

The PRP open space system that resulted had two components: first, there were permanent open spaces that were not to be built on - ever. These were based on the resource categories mentioned in the discussion of the PRP contents. The specific EDAW categories, however, were not used - partly because the report was not publically distributed in time (the ABAG staff had viewed it in draft form), and partly because of an uncertainty over the political ramifications of what was still a very untried approach. Thus, while their plan proposals were based largely on the thinking in the EDAW report, the staff did not present them explicitly as such.

The permanent system was shown both on the recommended plan and in the special element which broke that designation into categories of purposes. What is remarkable about these diagrams is that they imply the establishment of an "inner green line" that would henceforth constrain the physical growth of the metropolitan region. If one follows the permanent open space system around the urban core of the region, the suggestion of an Unwin-like "green girdle" is most definitely present.

The staff had arrived at these open space boundaries partly by isolating those lands they felt had great positive significance for the region's form and development. While in some places they were designated to expressly limit growth, in general they were not tied to a policy on the desired size of the region - the rationale for their location tended

to rest more on public safety, resource preservation and viewship concerns.

But although the permanent open space system was not fully seen as a limitation to physical expansion when it was presented, it set a line of thinking that would be most decidedly picked up when the open space proposals for the 1970 Regional Plan were made.

The second component of the open space system was the reservation of a large amount of land for possible urban expansion after 1990. In fact, this category was a collection of all that wasn't planned urban, or permanent open space. The reasoning behind designating lands in this fashion was almost entirely political; while it was a major step to propose any sizable permanent open space system, the staff judged that it would not be possible to designate as permanent lands other than those which it felt thoroughly capable of justifying. The result was to leave the remainder for urbanization - with, however, the qualifier "after 1990".

Under scrutiny, the 1966 ABAG attempt to establish a planning base for a regional open space system seems flawed. But the criteria of that scrutiny are more influenced by the prevalent environmental consciousness of the present-day. That the technical grounding of what was proposed was not rigorous, or that it was sensitive to the strong political pressures of the time do not detract from the basic and most important contribution of the attempt: it was a shaping of future efforts, a direction. To only see it in the light of strict analysis is to miss the value of inspiration and foresight, and instead sacrifice a valuable idea to short-sighted reality. Mumford's thoughts are particularly appropriate:

A plan loses some of its efficacy as plan if it sacrifices, at the beginning, the clarity of the ideal by timidly anticipating all the qualifications and reductions that ideals are subject to in the course of their translation. . . Plan, then, is not a substitute for intelligent choice, decision or invention on the part

of those who must execute it in detail; it rather assumes the existence of these qualities and organizes the milieu in which they can most effectively work.¹⁶

The 1966 PRP permanent open space system, and the resulting metropolitan form it defined had become part of the region's planning tradition. In 1970, the Regional Plan would take that system one step further.

The Review : November, 1966 - January, 1968

Following the publication of the PRP and its acceptance by the General Assembly, the ABAG planning staff now moved into the review phase. The procedures to be followed in the review had been developed toward the end of the planning work on the preliminary plan. Briefly, they consisted of four elements: individual meetings with city and county members, open invitations to comment, extended to all citizen groups, civic organizations and interested individuals; seven general public hearings throughout the region; and a system for incorporating the responses from the above activities into the ongoing program.

The review period was originally proposed as six months, but was expanded by cautious PRC and Executive Committee members to almost fourteen months; January 31, 1968 was set as the final date for comments. In that time, approximately 100 meetings were held by the ABAG staff; additionally there were several special sessions with the PDC.

The review procedure as it finally turned out was longer than Hickey had wanted it, but the political pressures in the Association forced the longer period. In retrospect, this was probably for the better, for if the staff had wanted to foster discussion, it now got it - too much in some places.

Overlying all of the specific critiques of the PRP were several issues. First, the time pressures and low funding of the planning program made it impossible for the staff to thoroughly justify all of the decisions that

had been made in the PRP. This problem, when coupled with the fact that most of the review meetings were held at a city level, led to an overriding concern with some of the specific plan designations - just where was the line between residential and agricultural uses? The difference in detail between regional maps and local area maps began to create communication difficulties.

But it wasn't just the communication difficulties that were problematic: there was a deeper problem, one having to do with the role of the regional plan. For years, members of local governments and indeed most citizens, had grown accustomed to responding to plan proposals for their particular locality - there had been little or no exposure to planning at a regional level. Therefore, the grain of the regional plan was confusing: if it wasn't the relatively more precise type of map the local citizens and officials were used to, what was it supposed to be? Further, the PRP offered a conceptual view of the region's future, another perspective that was not frequent at the local level. How could one go about evaluating or even understanding a concept plan of the regional future - particularly when it was very unclear just what effect that plan would have on the local communities, even if it was adopted by ABAG.

As it emerged in the course of the review, the problem seemed to be to communicate to people in all different types of urban settings, from Fairfield to San Jose, an equivalent of the intuitive understanding Hickey himself must have had sitting in his single office when the planning program first started: how to see planning and the plan with a regional sense of consciousness and responsibility? It was a problem that was not resolved then, and still is not today, even though much progress has been made.

Response from the Review

The actual criticisms and supporting statements about the PRP varied tremendously. Although there are exceptions to each of these, in general the following were the major areas of interest:

- 1) Population assumptions and the manner of forecasting future increases were challenged; some respondents called the forecasts too high because they felt that that specific projection would lower their perceived quality of life, some called them too low because they felt it would inhibit their desire to growth being linked causally to prosperity.
- 2) Transportation proposals inevitably ran into trouble; by and large the PRP had proposed too many freeways - rarely was the plan critiqued for not providing enough in the way of transportation facilities, except in the case of rapid transit.
- 3) The open space proposals were met with all degrees of support - no clear pattern emerged, although there was a strong tendency to at least support the proposed permanent system. (There was some concern over the economic feasibility of the system, ironically from Marin County which - in five years - would adopt a much stronger county open space plan than that proposed by the PRP, or the 1970 Regional Plan.)
- 4) The impact of the PRP and other alternatives on the social and economic structure of the region was seen as being inadequately explored.
- 5) There was much concern - cited above - over the generality of the plan; part of it resulted from confusion over the plan's role, part from the funding limitations of the program, and part from the ABAG staff simply needing the benefit of time and experience to strengthen its proposals.

The PDC played a special role in the review process, holding three special panel discussions on various elements of the plan. Whether its deliberations and comments had any substantial effect is unclear. However, what was clear from those sessions, was that the regional planning program still did not seem to have the whole-hearted support of a majority of the directors, as evidenced by minutes from PDC meetings following the review sessions.

A recurring issue in the plan review seemed to be that of achieving the active participation of the local governments in regional planning.

In an address to the mayors of the region, Jim Hickey made evident his concern over this:

If you ignore the question of regional goals, the plan report, and/or the program, they will have no meaning for you, and one day you may be surprised to see how it has developed. This is in no way a threat, but it is now apparent that some form of planning at the regional level will be maintained. If you merely react to it, the process will benefit, but you will have only realized half the potential value inherent in that planning process. If you use the planning process at the regional level, if you make it responsive to your needs, the regional plan and planning process will develop as one of the most powerful planning tools you have available.¹⁷

The PRP review produced nothing tangible - it was a means of explaining and re-explaining metropolitan regional planning to local governments. The comments and discussion generated by the Plan were carefully noted by the staff as reference points for the preparation of the regional plan; it was Hickey's intention to take that information and, in early 1968, make it the basis for the regional goals and policies that the Association would adopt.

The 1968-70 Planning Program

The overall thrust of the ABAG regional planning program was now in four areas: continuing review of the PRP; preparation of the regional plan; administration of the grant review procedures; and preparation of special study elements for housing, open space, the ocean coastline and physical resources. Publication of the regional plan was foreseen for late 1969.

But with all of this activity and momentum, the program was still having to struggle - particularly for funding. The preparation of the 1968-70 budget revealed questions reminiscent of the early RPC/TAG proposals for a planning program:

The question being asked and which the Association must answer in some manner is, 'At what level of operation does the Association intend to conduct its continuing planning program?' During the

past year this question has been asked in a number of different ways. For example, 'How can the Association develop a plan for a nine-county area on a budget smaller than that of the planning program for many of the individual nine counties that are a part of that plan?' or, 'How can the Association carry on a comprehensive planning program for the entire region on a budget that represents less than 15% of the amount the Bay Area Transportation Study is spending to study only the transportation needs of the same region?' or, 'How can you prepare a comprehensive plan for the entire region including a shoreline plan on a budget smaller than that of the Bay Conservation Commission's for shoreline planning only?'¹⁸

The program proposed by Hickey for 1968-70 was a greatly expanded one, with funding increasing 100%. This increase was seen by the staff as what should logically follow from the work already done, and from the requirements for future work that it was believed a good regional planning program should meet. Their arguments were convincing; by January, 1968 they had gained the support of key members of the RPC, and full Association support of the request seemed likely.

But in February, 1968, the assistant to the Association's executive director was discovered to have "diverted" a half million dollars in ABAG planning program funds - in the uproar that followed, all of the hard work that had been done in the past three and a half years was thrown back into doubt and confusion.

Chapter Four: THE REGIONAL PLAN 1968-1970

The "Truax Affair", as it was known, was discovered in mid-February, 1968. Tom Truax, the assistant to the Association's executive director, had for a year and a half been secretly "diverting" federal checks for the planning program before they were placed into the Association's accounts. By a chance event he was discovered, but disappeared before he could be apprehended. The realization of the theft became public, and ABAG was thrown into tremendous turmoil.

The story of the Truax Affair is not at issue here, however the impacts it had on the planning program are, and there were two major ones: first, the credibility of the Association was damaged locally, and even nationally. Coming at a time when the planning program seemed just on the verge of breaking out of its earlier difficulties of acceptability and permanence, the theft of the funds was a particularly devastating blow for the ABAG staff; there would now have to be much more effort expended reasserting the planning program's image, instead of moving into more refined planning efforts.

The second impact was the practical one of the interruption of the flow of money: the Department of Housing and Urban Development demanded extensive audits, as did the local governments - many of which threatened to pull out of the Association (only a few smaller cities actually did). During this time - mainly from February to September, 1968 - the actual planning tasks were left neglected in order to cope with the more pressing organizational difficulties. Consequently, much of 1968 became a "lost" year - very little was produced and, because

there was no way to replace the turnover, the staff shrank to three planners and a draftsman.

Of the planning programs that were interrupted by the theft, the analysis of the Preliminary Plan review comments was probably the biggest casualty; it was intended that the review be systematically analyzed and incorporated into a revised set of planning goals for the region. This in turn was to be fed into the much-strengthened proposed 1968-70 program, with the regional plan itself being produced by mid-1970. All of this now went by the wayside: the review analysis was not published until 1970, and the regional plan, although prepared on time, was not given the in-depth attention that had been intended.

By September, 1968, however, the workings of the Association and the planning program with it began to return to normal. Mostly through the dedicated work of Hickey and the ABAG President, Robert Miller, reassurances were made, procedures were developed to safeguard ABAG's finances, and the planning work was once again taken up.

It is difficult to underestimate the impact of the theft on the momentum of the planning program - three reports that were in final draft form were delayed in publication for over a year, there was an incentive problem in what now became a gradually diminishing staff (due to the withholding of federal funds pending the audit), and the extensive discussion of plan goals that was set for the February, 1968 General Assembly meeting never occurred. Therefore, although the planning program began to function more normally in late 1968, the damage probably extended into most of 1969 as attempts were made to catch up on the lost time. And, as if this were not problems enough,

in mid-1968 the ABAG program began coming under strong criticism from segments of the Planning Directors Committee.

From PDC to PDA

The PDC, which Hickey had re-started with the intent of providing a sounding board for ABAG's planning efforts, was in early 1968 experiencing an internal conflict that was at once "growing pains" and at the same time some long-sublimated disagreements. Among several of the directors the sentiment was strong that they were not affecting policy level decisions; as professionals in charge of programs that were in many cases larger operations than ABAG's this group felt constrained by the advisory role that had heretofore existed for them on regional planning matters. In addition, there was a desire among some for an organization of planning directors that, as an independent group, could speak on a variety of levels - not just in the context of ABAG's or BATSC's regional planning programs. Of specific concern here were desires to influence the planning profession at large, as well as the statewide level of governmental activity.

The issues came down to whether the directors' organization would continue as a professional advisory body to the regional planning directors (ABAG, BATSC and BCDC), or whether it would assume an outside policy role independent of - although in contact with - those agencies.

The result of the discussion was to choose the latter role and re-form the organization, changing the name to Planning Directors Association (PDA). Shortly after this was done, the planning directors' relationship with ABAG also underwent a change; now that it had in a

sense "declared independence", Hickey and McInnis, as chairman of the RPC, were not inclined to continue their supporting role for the PDA. Behind this split were some serious tensions among the professionals involved, with the ABAG planning program itself coming under attack.

Most of this debate was of a behind-the-scenes nature - while the issues involved were felt to be important, it was seen as more important that the regional planning program continue. There was recognition that a show of dissent among the professional planners, coming as it would in the midst of an already-charged atmosphere (due to the fund diversion) might do damage to the continuation or potential of metropolitan regional planning in the Bay Area. As a result, the arguments tended to remain "in-house".

In regard to the regional plan itself, a PDA review of the ABAG staff's proposed five-year planning program contained a controversial proposal:

The ABAG Regional Plan should not be adopted. It should only be acknowledged by the ABAG Regional Planning Committee and used as an interim frame of reference for further regional studies.

Adoption is not recommended because it would be meaningless if other jurisdictions with the power to implement it (i.e., local governments and other government agencies) did not understand it and concur with it. Obtaining meaningful endorsement by local and other affected government agencies would consume most of the five-year planning effort at the cost of the foregoing (sic) priorities.

Adoption of the plan purely as an ABAG statement without concern about its relevance to other affected government agencies would serve little purpose except to possibly meet a HUD guideline. On the other hand, it could cause complacency about regional planning (by making it appear that a meaningful plan was in existence) or it could cause disrespect for regional planning (because the plan does not provide a useable basis for decisions).

Shifting priorities, as discussed above, today suggest alternate courses as much more meaningful and useful than adoption of the current regional plan.

Although later amended out of the final version of the review, the no-adoption statement was clearly revealing of how at least one group in the PDA felt about much of the ABAG planning program.

In relation to the planning program more generally, the PDA review called for a "major reorientation" of program content. Emphasis should, it stated, now be placed on developing a "useable" regional data base, developing "a high quality urban simulation model", research and appraisal of socio-economic problems, research on methods of implementation, and the development of plan elements for those things which could, under existing legislative authorities, best be implemented now. In calling for these to be the components of a redirected program, and in the lack of support for an adopted plan, the PDA was touching on the core of a most basic question - most simply stated it was, should ABAG now plan, or attempt to do? Was the need to act, to "implement" something more pressing than the need to develop, regardless of the time it took, an agreed upon general plan for the region?

Behind these proposals lay two factors. First, since the 1968-69 period was one of much activity on the issue of regional legislation, there was a great deal of expectation among many of the planning directors that there would soon be a limited-function regional government. Since ABAG was only a COG, the reasoning went, it shouldn't be trying to do a plan in the first place; the question of whether it should try to implement special element plans for the same reason was left hanging.

Coupled with this was a somewhat less clear issue of territoriality:

The major thrust of the [PDA] proposals would seem to shift regional planning emphasis away from comprehensive physical planning toward provision of information services and social planning. This

would tend to build up a credibility in those areas and erode our credibility in those areas where we have some at present. Perhaps that is their intent. The proposals seem to reflect a fear that regional planning is assuming some of their own felt prerogatives.²

However, whatever the motivations the more substantial issue seemed to be whether ABAG should be doing a regional comprehensive physical plan, or whether it should focus more on data, simulation, social planning, and implementation of special elements. Was regional planning in ABAG to be a service to local governments, or was it to be a proposing/planning activity? There was clearly much pessimism on the part of some planning directors that ABAG - particularly since it was a COG - could ever effectively fulfill the rights and responsibilities of the latter function, but at the same time the directors left unanswered the equally important problem of whether it was desirable to act to implement ideas and policies in the absence of a general regional plan that would identify the future those policies were intended to bring about, regardless of institutional structure.

The issue went unresolved, and perhaps even more significantly, undiscussed. Pressures to retain federal certification for grants, and a reluctance among the professional planners to force principle at the cost of damaging the overall credibility of the planning program led to eventual PDA support for adoption of the Regional Plan. Their recommendation in 1970, however, was less than enthusiastically supportive:

Our Association is fully aware that the adoption of the Regional Plan 1970:1990 must be followed by many other studies and will be considered a working document for a number of years, however, we feel that its adoption...is a necessary and proper first step in establishing a planning base from which to work, and further, that the present recommendation from the Regional Planning Committee and Executive Committee of ABAG that has been included in the Regional Plan 1970:1990 is sound and represents a meaningful refinement of the Preliminary Regional Plan.³

BATSC

In mid-1969 BATSC was terminated, as specified in its enabling legislation. There had been no provision for a successor agency, but federal transportation grant eligibility requirements made it essential that some body be carrying out continuing regional transportation planning.

The BATSC final report, made in early 1969, consisted of four elements:

1. A description of transportation in the setting of the San Francisco Bay Area.
2. The survey data that had been collected in the agency's five years.
3. Forecasts for the design of future alternative transportation systems.
4. The steps needed to prepare and carry out a master transportation for the region.

Viewing the BATSC work effort, one has to note that the agency expended almost four and a half million dollars, and the Bay region still had no transportation plan. The widespread judgement of BATSC was that it had been quite unproductive - and expensively unproductive. The only substance it produced was raw data: there was no interchange of that data with local planning agencies, no plan, no policies, and nothing to indicate what substantial direction transportation in the region should henceforth take.

The resulting void in leadership in transportation planning had been perceived early. All along, the ABAG staff had been frustrated by BATSC's inabilities, and in February of 1968 Hickey and several other Association members moved to form an Ad Hoc Committee to recommend a replacement for the soon-to-be-terminated BATSC.

The first step toward this was a letter of intent between the State and ABAG "concerning the need for a continuing comprehensive and co-operative transportation planning process properly integrated with overall regional planning".⁴

For a time, the State had pressed for a completely separate new agency, nominally under ABAG, but in fact a continuation of BATSC. However, after much discussion the following three stage process was recommended by the Committee members:

First, two agencies - ABAG and a separate transportation agency - would exist to do regional land use planning and transportation planning, respectively. The two would agree to work together.

Second, the policy makers of both would be merged under ABAG, the staffs remaining separate.

Third, the two staffs would be combined to create a single, comprehensive land use and transportation planning agency - perhaps in five years.

The key to this proposal was that the Association accept the responsibility for the continuing transportation planning process, and create a Planning and Transportation Commission to replace the RPC.

Overall, the Ad Hoc Committee proposal was a sweeping one - it was a means of strengthening regional planning and hopefully avoiding the difficulties that had enveloped BATSC. It was also largely a result of Hickey's personal involvement and his view of the future regional planning function. While the Truax affair had disrupted much of the planning work, Hickey viewed the termination of BATSC as an opportunity not to be missed by ABAG.

But the bold proposal was not be implemented. In June of 1968, Warren Schmid, then executive director of the Association, resigned due to the fund diversion. In the selection process that followed, the dominant criteria for replacing him was to find someone who could restore "quiet"

to the Association's affairs. Three people, including Hickey, were considered. The person selected, J. Julien Baget, a city manager from San Rafael, was just what the more conservative faction of the Executive Committee had wanted - Hickey, probably viewed as an activist who would try to strengthen and expand the ABAG planning program, was not.

The implications of this selection on the proposed ABAG takeover of BATSC were tremendous - at the BATSC Executive Board meeting where the issue of takeover was to be considered, Baget had the Ad Hoc Committee proposal in front of him, but failed to present it. Seemingly, he viewed such an action as improper, given the low profile he had been selected to take; given the Association's difficulties, he apparently felt that the new executive director should not appear to be "pushy". The result was that the BATSC board members and others concluded that ABAG was not interested in making the commitment to assume the transportation planning function, and they moved to other alternatives. The final result was the establishment, in early 1970, of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) as a separate transportation planning body, operating under state statute.

As with BCDC, the Association had missed another opportunity to grasp regional planning as a strong and desired function. Perhaps more than anything it was this that led to Hickey's eventual leaving in 1970, after the Regional Plan had been prepared and adopted.

Preparing the Regional Plan

The actual work of preparing the Regional Plan did not begin until late in the summer of 1969. Much of the planning work in the year prior to that time had gone into finishing the several studies that had been

disrupted by the fund diversion - an ocean coastline study, a regional housing study, and a regional open space element that elaborated on the Preliminary Plan proposals were all completed by mid-1969.

In addition, the staff had current work commitments to a regional airport study, the continuing A-95 grant review program, and a joint study of the Bay delta area. All of this had to be undertaken by a staff of approximately eight - it was not until after the regional plan was published that staffing would increase significantly. While there were other persons working on a part-time or consulting basis for the program, it was the eight - including professionals and non-professionals - who in mid-1969 constituted the ABAG planning staff.

The decision to begin preparation of the recommended regional plan had been made over the past six years. However, with the after-effects of the Truax theft still lingering, and the federal government demanding a plan for retention of grant eligibility there was a strong incentive to produce that plan now. ABAG needed an infusion of action to bolster its sagging credibility.

As a first step toward completing the plan, Hickey hired Rudolph Platzek onto the staff in November of 1969. Having worked part-time with ABAG to complete some of the earlier studies, Platzek was given the responsibility of developing the plan proposal. Coming from a design-oriented background similar to Hickey's, Platzek had had experience primarily as a consultant on central city renewal programs in the Bay Area. After studying new town design with Constatine Doxiados, he had returned to school at the University of Michigan for a masters degree in regional planning. Upon returning to the Bay Area, he worked as a lecturer for

the University of California's Department of City and Regional Planning, and as a part-time consultant to ABAG.

With the executive director occupied by the task of recovering the lost funds and restoring administrative order to the Association's financial affairs, and with Hickey having to spend most of his time working both on the other program studies and helping to re-establish the political support for the planning program, Platzek had essentially a free hand in developing an initial plan. Beginning in November of 1969 and working through January, he developed a rough draft to be used for review by the RPC, the Executive Committee, and the PDA.

In the process of developing the plan, the damage caused by the problems that the fund diversion brought remained evident. Upon beginning work, Platzek found that the only working information base was the PRP document itself, the raw data of the BATSC study, an untabulated set of responses to the PRP review and a modest amount of current land use data. Cornish, who had been the principal planner for the PRP, had since left ABAG, creating a further problem of continuity.

What remained in the way of policies from the PRP effort was the set of goals adopted by the General Assembly in 1968, an "accepted" projection that population would grow from four million to 7.2 million by 1990, and a commitment, derived from PRP reviews and General Assembly action to a "city-centered" form of future development. This, coupled with the data existed, formed the basis on which the regional plan would have to be proposed.

Since there were significant time pressures at work - members of the RPC in particular were pressing for completion of the plan by mid-1970, the drafting process was carried out mainly in isolation from any policy review - the review that was done came in early 1970 from the RPC, the

planning directors, and the Executive Committee.

In viewing these pressures and the available information, Platzek developed the following priorities. The first thing was simply to get the plan done; it was understood, and explicitly recommended in the Plan document itself, that there be a formal review of the whole plan every five years, and that the 1970 version was therefore not the final version. To meet the various pressures for completion and to get this formal review process established, a product that set out at least a strong conceptual framework for the region's future was essential.

The second priority was built on the first: if it was important to get the regional planning process moving again, the key quality of the plan itself should then be readability and understandability. Like the PRP, the regional plan was now seen as more the first step in a process of frequent reviews, hence it had to focus debate again on the essential, conceptual, choices that the region had to make. For this version, technical precision and detail were not the overriding values.

The third concern that Platzek focused on was how to understand the adopted "city-centered" concept. While acceptable at a general level, there had been no indication in the PRP review of what the more operational implications of this term might be, other than that it was preferred over other alternative plan concepts. Hence, an attempt to further define the term and its relationship to its corollary, the permanent open space system, was crucial.

One thing that emerges from looking at these strategic considerations is that the bulk of the work on the regional plan was directed toward establishing - or re-establishing a substantive direction for regional policy. Future regional planning was viewed as being effective only to the extent that the concepts of a regional comprehensive plan were thoroughly under-

stood. Specific implementation actions were needed, but would not be desirable if prepared in a goal "vacuum." This had been the basis for the tension in the new PDA - was regional planning to be service-oriented, or a leadership function? If it was to be the latter, it would necessarily entail a plan that would often "compete" and disagree with local plans, forcing conflicts which policy choices would then have to resolve. If, on the other hand, ABAG were to ignore a general plan/advocacy role and be more a service for local planning efforts, then management would replace leadership as a style of operation. Rather than espouse a regional interest concept through a general regional plan, ABAG would in this role act as more of a mediator with substantial information capabilities. It would not be a proponent of its own strongly articulated regional goals.

Although neither side saw (or sees) these roles in their more extreme and caricatured form, the conflict did and does exist. The views are therefore presented as more black-and-white for purposes of clarifying the nature of the debate.

The technical details of how the plan diagram designations were arrived at were not extensively researched for this paper. As with the PRP, a strong factor was local plans and policies - although not taken as an unchallenged constraint, they certainly posed limits and were the basis for many of Platzek's recommendations.

Most of the diagram proposal itself came from what is simply described as density-based allocation of foreseen future population increases. Since the future population projection had been accepted as 7.2 million by 1990, the problem was distribution consistent with the vaguely-defined city-centered/permanent open space concepts. What resulted was a spreading of that increase at densities generally equal to those of Berkeley - about

eight units per acre in residential terms. Assumptions about employment space requirements and a flexible supply of land available for development were made, and these, taken with the residential space allocations, were distributed as a land use arrangement.

Combined with the written problems, this package was then reviewed by Hickey and other staff. In the early part of 1970, meetings with city and county planning directors were held to get their comments, and in March, 1970 the draft was given to the RPC for review.

In April, the plan went to the ABAG Executive Committee for review and comment, and in the two months following, was written into final form for publishing by the July General Assembly meeting. On July 30, the General Assembly voted to adopt the plan, thus completing the process begun in 1962 and earlier, and yet at the same time also representing a commitment to refine and improve on the Plan in the future years.

Shortly after the plan was approved, Hickey, having made his intentions known earlier, resigned as planning director, later assuming the position as director for Napa County. Platzek became the director in his place.

The Regional Plan Proposals (see appendix for Plan diagram)

Much of the Regional Plan document was an attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the regional planning function. Despite the recent problems, by 1970 it was clear that ABAG's planning program was going to continue to be maintained, and the staff wanted to present both a plan proposal and a planning framework proposal. The framework discussion was brief, but represented a foot in the door. It reviewed ABAG's plan history and identified a need for a full range of plans, from long-term goal concepts to short-range, specific programs. The city-centered concept, the population increases of 3 million people and the six adopted

regional goals were seen as part of this framework. Within the limits posed by these, the Regional Plan proposals themselves could be made.

The content of the plan itself had four elements that were significant. First, population increase and resulting development were taken to be an assumption, rather than a policy. Although these would be later attempts to get Association members to deal with growth as a matter of willful policy, not just accepted trend, such efforts were not part of the 1970 Regional Plan.

What was taken as policy was the allocation of that population: future urban development should be located within areas so designated on the plan diagram, and in accordance with plan policies.

The second key proposal of the plan was that:

Within the twenty year period covered by the Regional Plan, the largest proportion of future growth is treated as planned extension of existing built-up communities. This decision is based on the recognition that it will be at least ten to fifteen years before inter-governmental urban growth policies will significantly redirect the forces accounting for the current outward expansion of urban growth.⁵

One has to view the plan in its entirety to see the direction called for by this idea: the urban designations in the Plan are not just a means of accommodating future development - rather, when coupled with the Plan's large, permanent open space system, they are holding zones which the region will commit itself to while it goes about developing mechanisms to make that willful structuring of the physical configuration of the metropolis possible on a permanent, or at least very long term basis.

The third main element of the plan was its designation of those urban areas. Instead of identifying a hierarchy of urban densities, the Plan termed urban, any land with more than one residential unit per acre, or lands that were utilized for employment or transportation locations. The effect of this was to establish a "container" within which local policies

But there was more to the proposed open space system than just being what wasn't urban. Like the PRP, open space embraced many categories of uses, primarily resource-conserving or hazard-preventing ones. These formed, in an overlapping manner, the great bulk of the open space designated. But a large amount was designated in order to shape and guide urban development; it is this category which is most interesting.

Platzek and Hickey had, as mentioned, strong design backgrounds. As a consequence, there was a heavy emphasis in the Regional Plan creating visual form; since compact urban development was like water without a container, it needed to be held together by preserving-permanently-open lands at key points.

The specific purposes in preserving such lands were threefold: first, there was felt by the staff to be a great need for direct contact with open space close in to the compact urban areas. The need for such lands encompassed recreational uses, visual enjoyment and the economic benefits of nearby agriculture:

The Plan anticipates that, as the population continues to grow, contact with the natural environment will become more and more crucial to maintaining a healthy lifestyle. This consideration has been a major influence on the judgement of the need for permanent open space in the region.⁶

The values that such open space would provide were abstract, but the staff did not see them as less compelling because of it.

The second rationale for open space as a design and management tool was that of enhanced community identity and regional imaginability; lands specifically designed to separate communities from each other were proposed in an attempt to prevent the assumed loss of civic pride and community identity that a continuous urban pattern would bring.

The third use of such open space was one not articulated in the Plan itself, but one which was definitely in the mind of at least Platzek: in

this instance, open land was used to define an inner line between compact urban uses and the permanent open space. Such lands were to be a future growth management tool whereby the expansion of urbanization could be placed under regional - and local - scrutiny. A portion of regional planning would then focus on regulating uses in these transition zones.

The second major classification of open space was proposed as being "Controlled Development" lands. These were questionable areas as far as permanent preservation went and often so designated due to political considerations but the Plan was clear that they were not meant to be even considered for development until after 1990:

Need for further expansion of the 1990 urban boundaries shown on the Plan map should be determined only after careful consideration at both the local and regional levels.⁷

All of these proposals were based on extremely subjective factors - they were judgements on lifestyle, and if taken seriously would begin to alter much of the direction of local planning policy. In essence, they were the beginning of a physical limit to urban metropolitan expansion. In fact, when taken as a whole, the 1970 Regional Plan was asking for affirmation of a much different future than most local governments were moving toward. There might be disagreements over some of the locations designated as urban or open, but this was not the important point. Rather, the question was, should we make plans that will guide us in two types of actions: first, in setting aside lands that will provide for our urban space needs for the next fifteen years while we develop control mechanisms that we will need if we are to actually shape, guide and limit our future physical growth; and second, should we then, as a necessary step in shaping, guiding and limiting that growth, set aside permanently a greenbelt that will surround that growth and provide us with the resultant benefits?

This was and remains a radically different set of questions for urban planning to deal with at the regional - and local - level than are being asked now.

It is in the following observation that the direction and challenge of the 1970 ABAG Regional Plan is perhaps best expressed:

A planner who has to assume that his town may never cease to grow cannot arrive at even approximate formulations for such [physical facility] dimensions; the best he can do is to think of a number and, to be on the safe side, double or triple it. . . No matter how orderly the original design, in the absence of continuing control for development confusion of uses must arise.⁸

In 1976, it still remains to be seen whether governments - or city planners - will confront these issues. Although adopted by the Association's General Assembly, the 1970 Regional Plan is a first attempt that has, sadly, remained only that.

AFTERMATH

Today, six years after the adoption of the ABAG Regional Plan 1970:1990, the direction of metropolitan plan-making and metropolitan plans in the San Francisco Bay Area is unclear. By 1973, most of the staff that had worked on the 1970 Plan had left, including Platzek. Also in 1973, the Association hired a new executive director - one who is an activist, and much different from those of the past years. The role of metropolitan physical planning in ABAG has shifted as a result, now being somewhat less prominent than before.

The role of the Plan itself has also shifted. The review process which was intended to regularly revise the Plan's policies and proposals was never really instituted, and today the Plan diagram is viewed only as an example, not a goal. The regional plan is now seen - at least by the staff - as the sum of all of the special elements and policy decisions that have been made in the past twelve years, including those in the Regional Plan 1970:1990 document: if, then, one were to ask for "the regional plan", a very large stack of documents would be presented in answer. As the Association in 1976 begins the preparation of an "Environmental Management Plan", financed by \$4.3 million in grants (the same as the 1964 BATSC budget), that stack will grow even larger.

Whether or not this move away from having a single concise general plan for the region is a good one or a bad one is a question that should occupy another work like this one. I suspect that metropolitan regional planning, if it seeks to attain the type of goals adopted in the Regional Plan 1970:1990, is not best served by the current direction; the question of what both the Association and its staff now desire for the Bay region's future physical development is very much obscured by present practice.

The reluctance of ABAG to be "tied" to a general plan for the Bay Area only underscores the uncertainty about the direction of all of its cumulative policy and grant review decisions. In the process it has also made it difficult for citizens to evaluate its proposals and react, negatively or positively, to the effects they will have on the region.

The ABAG staff has now grown to approximately 125 persons. They are all capable, competent professionals, and the planning work they now undertake often involves the newest in "sophisticated" methodology. But with all of this it remains difficult to understand the values they are seeking to advance in planning for the future management of land uses in the region.

CONCLUSIONS

The continual, deliberate presentation of clear schemes for the basic elements of the future physical organization of metropolitan regions should remain among the most important functions of urban planning. In an age where complexity seems to grow without limit and in equal measure to our increases in knowledge and capacity to process that knowledge, we have become highly resistant to general plans which attempt to fulfill this function.

In recognizing that ecology means the understanding of interrelationships, we have plunged ahead to grasp the subtleties of those interrelationships and have left behind their simple and basic organizing principles - we have neglected to simultaneously apply our efforts to the integrated use of information with principle. In reacting to many of the excesses of the grandiose master plans of the early days of urban planning, we now refuse to understand the uses that are so beneficial in such efforts; we call all attempts at developing and pursuing dreams "end-state" plans, and instead prefer to "structure value choices for decision-makers", or to "quantify the relative costs and benefits" in the hope that there then will somehow emerge images and plans that will be seized on by a willing and understanding public. We will probably wait in vain, succumbing to the slow creep of mediocrity while the man-made metropolis damages itself and a significant and perhaps crucial part of its natural environment.

However, the reassertion of basic questions about the physical form and organization and size of our metropolitan areas is by no means a guarantor of a better future, even if we were capable of forcefully or effectively injecting them into the arena of public decision-making. Too many bold visions have proven to be shallow, unpopular, impractical or simply destructive toward that which they wish to nurture: most of the plans for central

city redevelopment that would (and did) remove vast chunks of deteriorated urban fabric and replace it with new and "better" tissue, and the schemes that offered the "benefits" of sixteen-lane roadways, sixty-story residence towers and twenty million people over the next thirty years all stand as monuments to a corruption of willful planning, and a warning on the dangers of its misuse.

And yet the power and benefits of ideas willfully translated into plans and actions have offered us much in the way of vital and beautiful urban places. Few would argue that London is a worse place to live because of the greenbelt - that the housing prices are high and business continues to frustrate relocation policies is by no means evidence that the precepts which led to the greenbelt are wrong. It is only an indication that public policy must rearrange the self-destructive forces of a market economy. Sacrificing the greenbelt would not solve the problem, only postpone its reckoning date - and perhaps increase the price that would finally have to be paid.

In the Bay Area, it was not action resulting from voluminous studies that initiated the movement to save the Bay from becoming a river. It was "the crude exercise of will" that moved tens of thousands of people to support the clear and basic goal of preserving a vision that inspired action. And there are few who would argue that BCDC was a wrong or premature decision.

The rationale for saving the Bay was not detailed and complex. Although the planning machinery that was necessary to finally accomplish the task needed - and got - a detailed technical rationale, the main argument for its preservation was not. It was a simple recognition that the Bay was an ecological system, that if the man-made metropolis interfered with that system both it and the system would suffer.

It is this logic that we seem to now be unable to constructively integrate with our current efforts to plan our urban areas; we avoid or even refuse to ask questions this basic about urban settlements and the biological and cultural ecology that relates them to both the natural environment and themselves.

This thesis has been about the development of metropolitan general plans for the San Francisco Bay Area. While attempting to provide a reasonably complete chronology and description, it has also tried to interpret that history as the contrast between willful planning and management planning. I have associated willful planning with efforts in London, the BARTC plan and the ABAG 1970 Regional Plan. On the other hand, the New York Regional Plan of 1926, the approach of the 1960 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers report, and the basis and methodology of the BATSC effort stand as approaches to the planning of metropolitan regions which will probably never provide us with the kinds of insights and questions we need in order to create an urban environment in which "the nurture of life is the main aim of the collective endeavor."¹ They will almost always lead us into forgetting that "trend is not destiny": urban planning that manages rather than shapes a future is only management, not planning.

In the introduction I indicated that key elements in the organization of the man-made metropolis were of concern here. It is my view that those elements are the horizontal size, the density and the ultimate population size of a metropolitan region; any planning attempt which confuses or is unwilling to articulate its position about the desirable future configuration of these elements will be incapable of generating understanding and support for its goals. Worse, in failing to acknowledge the existence of limits it will lead us to a future that will be decidedly less beneficial

than our present conditions. While the precise definition of limits will never be a result of some "neutral" methodology, the lack of that detail does not remove the imperative to consciously confront and attempt to answer such questions:

In our time, new technical facilities have altered many social functions: but the principal of limitation is still imperative. The alternative. . . is to keep on overcrowding and over-building. . . There is an optimum area of urban expansion, beyond which further urban growth tends to paralyze rather than to further important social relationships.²

I do not argue that we must cease our highly technical forms of planning, only that we must shift a very significant portion of our resources to the question of limits in its most basic form: size, density, area. Nor do I argue that physical form and structure must dominate our concerns in urban planning. But no better future will come if we continue to use complexity as a rationale for not attempting to deliberately grapple with the fact that forever expansive physical growth is unhealthy and dangerous.

The ABAG 1970 Regional Plan was a tremendous step toward confronting these issues. It laid bare the beginnings of a framework for debate - and decision - on the question of limits. In its present planning approaches, the Association has negated that effort, instead falling into the trap of confusing operational planning with general planning, and consequently obscuring the respective roles of each.

It is in the concept of the general plan that this debate best focuses. The purpose of a metropolitan general plan is not to provide detailed guidelines for short-term decision-making. Rather it is to allow public representatives - and with them professional planners - to debate and then agree upon a definite policy direction for future action. It is simplistic and misleading to point out that a general plan is "end-state": that is not the point. It portrays a presently agreed-upon future for the physical

development of an urban place. That plan may change, but without it, public political processes will be left in a world of confused direction - or no direction at all.

The process of preparing and adopting a general plan must remain one of the most important acts of government. Without that process, basic questions and issues will never be deeply understood by those in public office, or by those in professional roles, or by citizens at large. If individuals do not have or develop a gut-level understanding of the direction believed most desirable to move in, and articulate that as a strong consideration in all public policy decisions, then the overwhelming complexity of our current technologies will leave us rudderless. The development of general plans is a tremendous tool for breaking out of this man-made lethargy, yet we ignore their usefulness.

Are we too embarrassed to admit that our "sophisticated" urban settlements may - and perhaps should - be ultimately given physical structure by concepts as basic as area, size and density? Howard's Garden Cities of Tomorrow is simple, not simplistic: we need to learn that lesson.

Finally, the role of the professional planner in the planning process must be subjected to a similar scrutiny: professionals unable to openly believe in and articulate concepts or visions will block public discussion of the formulation of physical limits. At times throughout the history of Bay Area metropolitan planning there have been mechanisms to allow, and more importantly facilitate, the formation and operation of small groups of professionals who choose to explore such organizing elements. The Telesis group and the early Planning Directors Committee, however imperfect their thinking, at least began to grapple with the problem of translating such concerns into topics for deliberate public debate. There is little of that

now in the Bay Area and I believe we need it more than ever.

The administration of old ideas has become all too commonplace in present day management-planning. We now need to apportion a large amount of our energies toward dreaming of new ways to bring forward attempts to confront the everpresent basic elements that organize the physical metropolis. A willful style of planning that can pose such questions is now required if we are to meet the challenge of planning for a vital man-made metropolis that will be expressive of essential human needs and natural environmental imperatives.

FOOTNOTES

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1. Osborn, Greenbelt Cities, pg. 129

Chapter One: METROPOLITAN PLANS AND PLANNING 1900 - 1945

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2. See Woo, pp. 8-18
3. Scott, American City Planning, pg. 176
4. Ibid., pg. 224
5. Mumford, "The Plan for New York", pg. 122
6. Ibid., pp. 150, 153
7. Ibid., pg. 122
8. Adams, in Scott, op. cit., pg. 292
9. Scott, op. cit., pg. 431
10. See Thomas, London's Green Belt, and Osborn, Greenbelt Cities
11. Osborn, op. cit.
12. Thomas, op. cit., pg. 73
13. Ibid., pg. 73
14. Ibid., pg. 80
15. Ibid., pg. 83
16. Ibid., pg. 84
17. Osborn, op. cit., pg. 18

Chapter Two: EARLY BEGINNINGS 1946 - 1960

1. Scott, The San Francisco Bay Area. . ., pg.
2. Ibid., pg. 201
3. Ibid., pg. 232
4. Ibid., pg. 248
5. Telesis Statement, August, 1949, pg. 2
6. Ibid., pg. 2
7. Stanbery, "Draft Statement. . .", July, 1948, pp. 1-2
8. Regional Planning Needs, pg. 17
9. Livingston, in Cornish, pg. 20

Chapter Three: THE ABAG REGIONAL PLANNING PROGRAM 1961 - 1967

Part One

1. See Institute for Local Self Government, "ABAG Appraised. . .", for a more detailed description
2. Scott, unpublished manuscript, 1971
3. ABAG, RPC report, September 1961, pp. 2-3
4. Ibid., pg. 2
5. Ibid., pg. 3
6. Ibid., pg. 3
7. Ibid., pg. 2

8. ABAG, RPC report, June 1962, pg. 2
9. Ibid., pg. 2
10. ABAG, RPC report, September 1961, Scott, unpublished manuscript
11. "ABAG Appraised. . .", pg. 42
12. ABAG, RPC report, October 1962, pg. 3
13. Kent, "City and Regional Planning", pg. 11

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1. ABAG files, 1964 HHPA application, pg. 4
2. Ibid., pg. 3
3. Ibid., pg. 3

Part Three

1. See Woo, and Gilliam, The Saving of San Francisco Bay, for fuller accounts
2. ABAG, "Regional Planning Program Outline", October, 1964
3. Ibid.
4. Boyce, Metropolitan Plan-Making, pg. 13
5. Ibid., pp. 25-6
6. Interview with James Hickey
7. See "San Francisco Planning Progress" (1947) and for a current example, "Recreation and Open Space Plan" (1972), both published by the San Francisco Department of City Planning
8. PDC minutes, March 13, 1968
9. ABAG, Preliminary Regional Plan, pg. 3
10. Ibid., pg. 9
11. Ibid., pg. 13
12. See Strong, Open Space for Urban America, and Whyte, W. H., Conservation Easements, (ULI) Washington, D.C. (1959)
13. EDAW report, pg. 81
14. Ibid., pg. 19
15. Ibid., pg. 82
16. Mumford, Culture of Cities, pg. 380
17. James Hickey, October, 1967
18. ABAG, "Proposed Budget 1968-70" (December 1967)

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1. PDA, "Proposed 5-Year Regional Planning Program", August 1969, pg. 4
2. ABAG staff memo, August 1969
3. PDA, op. cit., pg. 2
4. ABAG, "A BATSC-State Transportation Agency--ABAG Program Concept", October, 1968
5. ABAG, Regional Plan 1970:1990, pg. 16
6. Ibid., pg. 20
7. Ibid., pg. 20
8. Osborn, op. cit., pg. 8

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1. Mumford, Culture of Cities, pg. 377
2. Ibid., pg. 488

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APPENDICES

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